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Abstract

We present novel techniques to forward the goal of secure and private machine learning. The widespread use of machine learning poses a serious privacy risk to the data
used to train models. Data owners are forced to trust that aggregators will keep their
data secure, and that released models will maintain their privacy. The works presented
in this thesis strive to solve both problems through secure multiparty computation
and differential privacy based approaches. The novel FLDP protocol leverages the
learning with errors (LWE) problem to mask model updates and implements an efficient secure aggregation protocol, which easily scales to large models. Continuing on
the vein of scalable secure aggregation the SHARD protocol utilizes a multi-layered
secret sharing scheme to perform efficient secure aggregation on very large federations. Together, these protocols allow a federation to train models without requiring
data owners to trust an aggregator. In order to ensure the privacy of trained models,
we propose immediate sensitivity, a framework for reducing membership inference
attack efficacy against neural networks. Immediate sensitivity uses a differential privacy inspired additive noise mechanism to privatize model updates during training.
By determining the scale of the noise through the gradient of the gradient, immediate
sensitivity trains more accurate models than differentially private gradient clipping
approach. Each of these works is supported by extensive experimental evaluation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Federated learning and distributed computing have gained considerable attention
from large data processors. These techniques process data on edge devices and aggregate their results into data product, such as a machine learning model. Used
well, they can significantly reduce the computation and data storage requirements of
centralized aggregators.
Because federated learning does not require the curation of a central dataset,
it is sometimes considered a more private variant of machine learning. However,
federated learning comes with considerable security and privacy risks. Membership
inference [4,5] and data poisoning [3] attacks enable adversaries to access the training
data in spite of this data remaining with the data owners.
The best known defense against membership inference attacks is to train models
with differential privacy.Differentially private training imposes a limit on the amount
that any individual’s data can influence the behavior of a model [6]. Enforcing this
limit also limits the amount of information an adversary can learn about any individual. Applying differential privacy to federated learning comes with considerable
1

obstacles. The contributions within this dissertation address the following two roadblocks to secure and private federated learning:
1. Important privacy preserving machine learning techniques such as noisy gradient
descent [7, 8] require a trusted aggregator to scale and add noise to gradient
updates. Without a trusted aggregator, a federation must use local differential
privacy [6] and considerably decrease model utility, or implement a trusted third
party using secury multiparty computation. Doing so incurs a significant increase
in training time [1], and limits the federation size as well as the potential model
complexity.
2. Training centralized machine learning models with leading privacy preserving
techniques is severely limiting. Preserving the privacy of complex neural networks requires too much noise to produce a useful model. Privacy and accuracy
are opposing goals in training a neural network, and the trade-off between these
goals is exacerbated by large models.

1.1

Significance

In this dissertation, we propose solutions to improve the throughput, federation size,
and accuracy of secure and private federated learning. This is done through advances
in private machine learning and advances in secure aggregation scalability. Because
secure aggregation protocols allow a federation to implement private machine learning,
these advances may compose into significantly improved federated learning.
Protocol 1 and functionality 2 describe the fundamental interface between secure
aggregation and private federated learning that we consider in this dissertation. Pro2

Protocol 1: FLDP Protocol
Runs on the untrusted server
Input : Set of clients P , noise parameter σ, minibatch size b, learning rate
η, clipping parameter C, number of epochs E.
Output: Noisy model θ.


2

Privacy guarantee: satisfies α, ECσ2 α -RDP for α ≥ 1, assuming honest
majority of clients in each batch

1
2
3
4
5

θ ← random initialization
for E epochs do
for each batch of clients Pb ∈ P of size b do
G ← NoisyBatchGradient(Pb , σ, C, θ) θ := θ − 1b ηG
return θ

update model

tocol 1 is identical to a traditional differentially private gradient descent algorithm,
with the key exception that it abstracts its batch aggregation and noise generation
to functionality 2. So long as functionality 2 is implemented properly, we will train a
secure and private model.
Functionality 2 describes that which we are looking for in a secure aggregation
protocol for private learning. Any protocol that successfully allows a federation to
add vectors together and add Gaussian noise to the result will enable that federation
to perform secure and private federated learning. The Gaussian noise required for
functionality 2 can be generated by each party adding a small amount of Gaussian
noise to their gradients before aggregation. The sum of all parties’ noises will be
Gaussian distributed. This means that any protocol enabling secure vector addition
will be able to implement functionality 2.
This reduction from centralized private learning to secure aggregation also implies
that improvements made to centralized private machine learning will naturally carry
over into the federated setting, so long as they use averaging to aggregate gradients.
Solutions for secure aggregation and centralized private learning already exist and
3

Functionality 2: Distributed NoisyBatchGradient
Runs on a trusted third party
Input : Batch of clients Pb of size b, noise parameter σ, clipping parameter
C, current model θ.
Output: Noisy gradient Ĝ. 

2

Privacy guarantee: satisfies α, Cσ2α -RDP for α ≥ 1, assuming honest
majority of clients

Part 1: each client pi ∈ Pb computes a noisy gradient and sends it to the
functionality F.
1
2
3
4
5

for each client pi ∈ Pb do
gi ← ∇L(θ, dataOf(pi ))
ḡi ← gi / max(1, kgCi k2 )
2
ĝi ← ḡi + N (0, σb I)
pi sends ĝi to F

compute gradient
clip gradient
add noise

Part 2: F computes the sum of noisy gradients and releases it to the server.
6
7

Ĝ ← bi=1 ĝi
F sends Ĝ to the untrusted server
P

sum individual gradients

will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, however these solutions have their limitations.
In secure vector aggregation, existing protocols are limited in their scalability with
respect to federation size [1], do not handle dropouts well [2], or do not handle large
vectors [9]. In private learning, current solutions are effective only for simple datasets
and small models [7, 10], or they require auxiliary data [7]. The work discussed in
this thesis strives to remove the limits facing secure aggregation and private machine
learning.

4

1.1.1

FLDP: A Learning With Errors Based Secure and Private Aggregation Scheme

Chapter 3 describes FLDP: a learning with errors based secure aggregation protocol
designed to efficiently aggregate very large vectors among a moderate sized federation
(e.g. 500 parties that each hold a vector of 1, 000, 000 elements).
Motivation
With FLDP, we enable federations to aggregate extremely large vectors. In federated
learning, the number of elements in one of these vectors corresponds to the number of
parameters in a given model. A protocol’s ability to handle large vectors will correlate
directly with it’s ability to enable the training of complicated models. The rudimentary solution of using shamir sharing [11] or packed shamir sharing [9] for vector
aggregation requires O(k ∗ n2 ) communication complexity where n is the number of
parties and k is the length of their vectors. Indeed, this solution is linear with respect
to the length of a vector, and can be used for very small federations. However, the
multiplicative nature of this communication complexity renders it useless for complex
models or federations with more than about 10 parties.
Bonawitz et al. [1] provides the most substantial improvement upon this complexity with a communication complexity of O(kn + n2 ). This is improvement is done
through pairwise additive masking [12]. Each pair of clients agrees on a one time
pad for their vectors. Then, one client adds the mask to their vector and the other
subtracts it. These vectors can be sent to an aggregator in the clear, and allow the
aggregator recover the sum of vectors. While this solution drastically improves upon
5

the vector size scalability of shamir sharing, it comes with a high startup cost and
costly dropout recovery procedure.
Contribution
For private secure aggregation, FLDP reduces communication complexity to O(nk+n)
and provides dropout robustness without additional communication. Each client
uses the learning with errors problem to generate a one time pad for their vectors.
Aggregation is then split into aggregating padded vectors, which is done by the server,
and aggregating the LWE secret-keys, which is done by clients using MPC. Dropouts
can be handled by the server. The server’s decryption leaves behind the errors, noise
added during encryption, which allows FLDP to satisfy differential privacy. This
novel protocol reduces expansion factor from 2x to 1.7x when aggregating 500 vectors
of length 20,000 and improves client and server computation times by an order of
magnitude.

1.1.2

Secret Sharing Sharing

FLDP enables a federation to train models with many parameters, however it is
limited in it’s expansion to using many parties. We present SHARD to aggregate
over the largest possible federations, in Chapter 4.
Motivation
Query sensitivity in differential privacy is not affected by dataset size [6]. Consider the
sum query. For identical sum queries over different sized datasets, identical additive
noise would provide an identical privacy guarantee, but the larger dataset will have
6

a much more accurate result by virtue of its larger signal to noise ratio. We see this
effect in private machine learning. Models trained with noisy gradient descent tend
to use larger batch sizes than those trained without noise [13]. Batch size in secure
and private federated learning is limited by secure aggregation’s party-wise scalability.
Both FLDP and the protocol outlined by Bonawitz et al. [1] are limited in their ability
to scale to large federations. The total communication complexity of both protocols
scale quadratically with the number of parties. Bell et al. [2] proposed one of the
first secure aggregation protocols to scale less than quadratically with respect to the
number of parties. This extension of [1] uses a more relaxed security guarantee to
reduce the number of other clients with whom a client must communicate. While
this protocol handles federations with millions of clients efficiently, it recovers from
dropouts very slowly and does not handle small vectors well.
Contribution
SHARD is a standalone secure aggregation protocol designed to handle large federations and dropouts gracefully. We base SHARD on shamir sharing, and employ the
first multi-layered secret sharing scheme. In SHARD, each party secret shares their
vector, then secret shares the shares. Aggregating shares of shares in small groups
does expose secrets to adversaries. We are able to take advantage of the malicious
secure properties of shamir sharing, and implement SHARD in the malicious version
of Bell et al.’s security model. Over the previous work, SHARD offers the following
key contributions:
1. Dropout robustness. Like FLDP, SHARD handles dropouts with no additional
communication cost to clients.
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2. Efficiency. SHARD reduces server computation complexity to O(kn) with n
clients each having k-length vectors. SHARD is also far more communication
efficient for small vectors (< 1000 elements).
Assuming 5% of parties are corrupt and 5% of parties will dropout, SHARD can
aggregate 100, 000, 000 vectors of length 100 while requiring less than half a second
of sever computation time and less than 100ms of computation time for the client.
Furthermore, each client only needs to communicate with 350 other clients in this
scenario.

1.1.3

Immediate Sensitivity

Chapter 5 focuses on improving the accuracy of private machine learning, an essential
component to usable secure and private federated learning.
Motivation
Advancements in differentially private deep learning are crucial to the adoption of
secure and private federated learning. Many of these algorithms are directly applicable to the federated setting using secure aggregation. Abadi et al.’s seminal work
in the field provided the first major success in training neural networks privately [7].
They utilize gradient clipping, privacy amplification by subsampling, and a moments
accountant to train reasonably accurate models with reasonably low privacy budgets.
On MNIST, [7] achieves 95% accuracy with  = 2. On CIFAR-10, they achieve 70%
accuracy, but treat CIFAR-100 as public data and pretrain their layers using this
dataset. Numerous other approaches have been proposed using improved accounting [14], different activation functions [10], and leveraging auxiliary data [15], but all
8

of these approaches lag severely behind non-private learning’s accuracy and training
speed. Private learning requires per-example gradient clipping. This substantially
slows down training. Many of these papers report accuracy results for very high privacy budgets ( ≈ 3). With such a high privacy budget, the guarantee provided by
these models is not very meaningful.
Contribution
We propose immediate sensitivity to improve accuracy and training speed in privacy
preserving machine learning. Immediate sensitivity is based on local sensitivity, which
measures how sensitive a mechanism’s response will be to specific values in the dataset,
rather than accommodating worst case samples. This avoids gradient clipping while
still providing a bound on the sensitivity of the training process. Unfortunately,
immediate sensitivity approach does not satisfy differential privacy, however we find
that it tends to protect models against membership inference attacks more effectively
than the gradient clipping approach. Membership inference attacks are an empirical
measure of information leakage in a model, so protection against them implies that
immediate sensitivity does protect the privacy of individuals to some extent.

1.2

Personal Contributions

The following list outlines my personal contributions to the works in this dissertation.
FLDP I credit my collaborators with finding the problem space of secure aggregation. The idea to use LWE to mask and privatize vectors is mine. I also contributed
significantly to the security proofs involved, and threat model specification. The
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implementation of FLDP uses UVM’s python distributed systems framework [16], to
which I have made major contributions. I also designed and carried out the scalability experiments, and wrote significant portions of the research paper. Specifically, I
wrote the LWE-based secure aggregation section and the evaluation section.
SHARD My contributions to SHARD are very similar to my contributions to
FLDP. I designed the multi-layer secret sharing approach, proved it’s security, implemented the protocol, and designed experiments to evaluate SHARD. With respect
to the paper, I had a significant contribution to every section.
Immediate Sensitivity The idea to apply local sensitivity to deep learning, and
the design and implementation of immediate sensitivity can all be credited to Joe
Near. My contribution to this work includes the implementation of membership
inference attacks, improvements to the immediate sensitivity code, the evaluation
design and execution, and writing the evaluation section of the paper.

1.3

Future Work

A clear direction ahead for future work is the composition of FLDP, SHARD and
immediate sensitivity. FLDP will work effectively with any secure vector aggregation
protocol for small vectors, and SHARD is a very efficient secure small vector aggregation protocol. The resulting protocol would have client communication complexity
O(k +log n) and server communication complexity O(ln+n). Given the experimental
results outlined in Chapters 3 and 4, we can expect aggregating 100, 000, 000 vectors
of size 100, 000 to take about 1 second of client computation and about 1 second more
10

server communication than unsecure aggregation.
These parameters are sufficient to ensure efficient secure and private federated
learning. For larger more complex models, batch sizes of up to 32, 768 have been
used to improve training speed [17] and batches with millions of samples have been
used to improve private model accuracy [18]. These models appear to be an excellent
use case for the work in this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter is broken into two sections. Section 2.1 reviews background information that will be helpful in understanding the technical contributions in this paper.
Section 2.2 is a detailed look at related approaches to secure and private learning.
Each subsequent chapter also includes a look at the literature relevant to the content
discussed in that chapter.

2.1
2.1.1

Primitives
Differential Privacy

Differential privacy [6] formally limits the amount of information an adversary can
learn about an individual from a function over that individual’s data. In broad
terms, if a differentially private mechanism is used on two similar datasets, it should
produce similar responses; it should not reveal the difference between the datasets.
Differential privacy uses the notion of neighboring datasets to define similarity between
12

datasets. Two datasets d and d0 are considered neighbors if the differ by the data of
one individual.
Definition 1. Differential Privacy [6] A randomized algorithm M satisfies (, δ)differential privacy if for all possible outputs x and for all neighboring datasets d and
d0 :
P r[M(d) = x] ≤ P r[M(d0 ) = x] ∗ e + δ
Definition 1 formalizes differential privacy. It is parameterized by the tuple (, δ)
which we call the privacy budget.  quantifies how different the outputs of the two
mechanisms can be while δ corresponds to the probability that the mechanisms different responses are not successfully bounded by e . In other words, δ is the probability
of failure. Smaller values of  and δ imply less information leakage. It is common
practice to hold δ constant throughout a series of experiments. Throughout this
dissertation, δ = 10−5 unless otherwise specified.
There exists a wide variety of mechanisms to satisfy differential privacy for different problems [6]. In this thesis we focus on the additive Gaussian mechanism, adding
Gaussian noise to query results. This mechanism provides favorable properties for
summation and count queries applied to large vectors many times [14, 19], and is the
standard in privacy preserving machine learning [7, 10].

2.1.2

Secure Multiparty Computation

Secure Multiparty Computation or MPC describes a family of techniques for distributed computation among mutually distrustful parties. MPC guarantees security
described using the real-ideal world paradigm [20]. Such protocols implement a func13

tionality that, in the ideal world, a trusted third party could run. If a protocol
provides adversarial parties with no more information than they would receive from
a trusted third party, then the protocol preserves the confidentiality of the parties’
inputs. To preserve integrity the protocol must disallow adversaries from corrupting
the output in any way beyond what they can corrupt with a trusted third party.
These guarantees are often proven using a simulator. Given the ideal functionality,
if it is possible to simulate all the information an adversary would receive from an
MPC protocol, then that protocol is secure.
Threat models the above guarantees are contingent on what behaviors we expect
from an adversary. Adversaries comprise some proportion of the parties involved
in the protocol, and security guarantees are parameterized based on the size of this
proportion. We expect adversarial parties to collude. For example, a protocol that
is honest majority secure will protect the confidentiality of inputs so long as the
colluding faction of parties comprises less than half of the federation.
The expected behavior of adversarial parties typically falls into two categories:
semi-honest and malicious. Semi-honest parties perform the protocol as described
while learning as much about the protocol’s private inputs as possible. Malicious
parties may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol unless otherwise specified by the
threat model. Common definitions of Malicious security do not account for availability
of outputs [20], and it is trivial for honest parties to abort after receiving malformed
messages. Therefore, proofs of malicious security will often only account for attacks
using well formatted protocol deviations [20].
Classic MPC protocols are designed to implement boolean or arithmetic circuits [21–23]. Protocols such as Yao’s garbled circuits can perform arbitrary computa14

tions in a constant number of communication rounds, but do not scale beyond 2PC or
two party computation [24]. Other protocols for arithmetic [23,25] or boolean [21,22]
circuits can handle more than two parties, but each require communication for multiplication or and gates. These protocols are also optimized for complex circuits rather
than large federations.

2.1.3

Learning With Errors

Learning with Errors or LWE [26] is a difficult computation problem often used in
quantum secure cryptography and fully homomorphic encryption [27].
Definition 2. Learning With Errors Assumption Suppose we have a ring Zq , a matrix
, a vector s ∈ Znq , a vector e ∈ Zm
A ∈ Zm×n
q where e X for some error distribution
q
§, and a vector b ∈ Zm
q such that:

b = As + e
Given (A, b), it is difficult to find s
The difficulty of LWE is left vague in this definition because the LWE assumption
is not proven, and bounds on the difficulty of this problem are dependent on the
parameter settings. The ring size q, secret vector length n and var(X ) seem to have
the most profound effect on difficulty. To increase difficulty of LWE, we want q to
be small, n to be large, and var(X ) to be large. For provable difficulty, q must be
√
polynomial in n, and var(X ) > 2 n [26]. This setting ensures LWE is as hard as the
discrete Gaussian sampling problem. With these parameter restrictions, increasing
n increases security. Outside the realm of provable security, estimation tools such as
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the LWE estimator [28] can evaluate the computation power required to solve LWE
given a set of parameters.
Similarly difficult variations of LWE exist for different applications. Ring Learning
with Errors or RLWE is polynomial based rather than vector based [29]. Short secrets
LWE uses secrets distributed by X rather than the uniform distribution [30]. In this
dissertation, we focus on traditional LWE.

2.1.4

DP-SGD

Applying deep learning to neural networks faces a few significant challenges. First
and foremost is how to add the privacy preserving noise while maintaining network
accuracy. An intuitive solution is to treat the entire network as the mechanism, and
add noise to the fully trained model weights [31]. This solution offers efficient model
training, but only works well for convex models, and therefore does not provide accurate neural networks. The vast majority of differentially private neural networks
are trained by adding noise to clipped gradients [7, 10]. This solution bounds the
normally unbounded l2 sensitivity of a batch of gradient updates with clipping. Once
bounded, the batch gradients have noise added to them in accordance with efficient accounting tricks such as privacy amplification through subsampling [32], the moments
accountant [7], Renyí differential privacy [19], concentrated differential privacy [33],
or Gaussian differential privacy [14].
Gradient clipping solutions can produce accurate models on small and simple
datasets [10], but lag behind substantially on complex datasets without auxiliary
information [15], and can significantly slow model training times.
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2.2

Related Work

The following section describes various approaches to secure and private neural networks, their virtues, and their drawbacks.

2.2.1

Centralized Privacy

If we assume the existence of a trusted third party that can train a neural network,
secure and private federated learning can be solved with centralized differential privacy. Solutions addressing this threat model abound [7, 10, 14, 15, 34]. Nearly all of
them utilize some variation of gradient clipping as popularized by Abadi et. al [7].
Currently, the Tempered Sigmoid approach appears to produce the most accurate
models on MNIST and CIFAR10 without auxiliary data at  ≈ 3 and  ≈ 6 respectively [10]. This approach utilizes a Tanh activation function as opposed to the more
popular ReLU in their model architectures. With the introduction of auxiliary data,
Scatter Net produces the most accurate results on these data sets [15]. The work
discussed in this thesis does not consider the existence of auxiliary data.
For secure and private federated learning, these techniques will produce the most
accurate model with the least communication and computation overhead. Of course,
the fundamental drawback to these methods is the unrealistic assumption that models
can be trained by a trusted third party. Work addressing this problematic assumption
is considered in section 2.2.2, and in the rest of this dissertation.
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2.2.2

Federated Techniques

Training a private machine learning model in the absence of a trusted third party
comes with increased training complexity, or decreased model utility when compared
to centralized privacy. Solutions accepting either of these penalties are discussed in
the following sections.
Local DP
In local differential privacy, clients apply privacy preserving randomization to their
data before sending it to a centralized aggregator. For simple datasets, noise can be
added to an individual’s datums directly [35], and aggregated into a private database.
Doing so minimizes communication overhead, and can produce accurate results with
very simple categorical datasets, and simple aggregation functions. Using local differential privacy for high dimensional datasets does not work well, because the noise scale
increases substantially. Neural network training has been done successfully with local differential privacy through gradient perturbation [36], and low dimensional latent
representations [37,38]. The gradient based approaches come at a cost to model accuracy or produce poor privacy guarantees, due to the high dimensionality of gradients.
Latent approaches achieve impressive accuracy results with very small budgets– [37]
trains a CIFAR10 model with 92% accuracy at  = .5– but they require the generation of the latent representation. Generating these latent representations typically
requires public data, and comes from a CNN [37], or PCA [38].
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MPC-based Approaches
Using MPC, a federation is able to perform privacy preserving calculations without
a trusted third party. These techniques implement a portion of the gradient clipping
approach described in section 2.2.1 using distributed techniques, most commonly, the
aggregation portion [1, 2]. These secure aggregation protocols use MPC to perform
just one addition gate, allowing them to scale to many parties [2], and large gradients [1]. Protocols outlined in this thesis fall into the secure aggregation category.
All secure aggregation protocols require some added cost to training computation
and communication, but can provide accuracy on par with models in the centralized
settings.
Other MPC approaches require a semi-honest data curator [39], or two noncolluding curators [40]. If these constraints are allowable in one’s threat model, then
these approaches scale gracefully, and produce accurate models.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Fully homomorphic encryption allows the majority of the training process to run on
a server without revealing the input values to the server. Using this approach can
theoretically reduce communication overhead by not requiring per-gradient communication, but current approaches are very computationally expensive. The CKKS
FHE scheme [41] can perform exp(x) on 213 values in .62 seconds. This is around
200 times slower than performing the same function on unencrypted values. With
this slowdown, training a CIFAR10 model would take about 3 days as opposed to 20
minutes. Most other FHE schemes include similar computation costs [27, 41–43].
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Chapter 3
Learning with Errors based Masking Aggregation

3.1

Introduction

Mobile phones and embedded devices are ubiquitous and allow massive quantities
of data to be collected from users. The recent explosion in data collection for deep
learning has led to significant new capabilities, from image recognition to natural
language processing. But collection of private data from phones and devices remains
a major and growing concern. Even if user data is not directly disclosed, recent
results show that trained models themselves can leak information about user training
data [4, 44].
Private data for training deep learning models is typically collected from individual
users at a central location, by a party we call the server. But this approach creates
a significant computational burden on data centers, and requires complete trust in
the server. Many data owners are rightfully skeptical of this arrangement, and this
20

can impact model accuracy, since privacy-conscious individuals are likely to withhold
some or even all of their data.
A significant amount of existing research aims to address these issues. Federated
learning [45] is a family of decentralized training algorithms for machine learning that
allow individuals to collaboratively train a model without collecting the training data
in a central location. This addresses computational burden in data centers by shifting
training computation to the edge. However, federated learning does not necessarily
protect the privacy of clients, since the updates received by the server may reveal
information about the client’s training data [4, 44].
Combining secure aggregation [1, 2] with differential privacy [6, 46] ensures endto-end privacy in federated learning systems. In principle, secure aggregation allows
user updates to be combined without viewing any single update in isolation. Methods
based on differential privacy add noise to updates to ensure that trained models do
not expose information about training data. However, secure aggregation protocols
are expensive, in terms of both computation and communication. The state-of-theart protocol for aggregating large vectors (as in federated deep learning) is due to
Bonawitz et al. [1]. This protocol has a communications expansion factor of more than
2x when aggregating 500 vectors of length 20,000 (i.e. it doubles the communication
required for each client), and requires several minutes of computation time for the
server.
In this paper we propose a new protocol, called FLDP, that supports scalable,
efficient, and accurate federated learning with differential privacy, and that does not
require a trusted server. A main technical contribution of our work is a novel method
for differentially private secure aggregation. This method significantly reduces com-
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putational overhead as compared to state-of-the-art– our protocol reduces communications expansion factor from 2x to 1.7x for 500 vectors of length 20,000, and reduces
computation time for the server to just a few seconds. The security of this method
is based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem [26]– intuitively, the noise added
for differential privacy also serves as the noise term in LWE.
To obtain computational differential privacy [47] FLDP uses the distributed discrete Gaussian mechanism [46] and gradient clipping, with secure aggregation accomplished efficiently via our new method. The accuracy of our approach is comparable
to that achieved by the central model of differential privacy, while providing better
efficiency and thus scalability of previous distributed approaches. We implement our
approach and evaluate it empirically on neural network architectures for MNIST and
CIFAR-10, measuring both accuracy and scalability of the training procedure. In
terms of accuracy, our results are comparable with central-model approaches for differentially private deep learning (on MNIST: 95% accuracy for  ≤ 2; on CIFAR-10:
70% accuracy for  ≤ 4).

3.1.1

Contributions

In summary, our contributions are:
1. A novel malicious-secure aggregation protocol that outperforms previous approaches to gradient aggregation with differential privacy.
2. A new end-to-end protocol (FLDP) for privacy-preserving federated learning
setting that uses our secure aggregation protocol to provide differential privacy
even in the presence of malicious clients and a malicious server.
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Setting
Client Communication
Client Computation
Server Communication
Server Computation

Bonawitz
O(k + m)
O(k 2 + km)
O(k 2 + km)
O(mk 2 )

Bell
O(log k + m)
O(log2 k + m log k)
O(k log k + km)
O(k log2 k + km log k)

FLDP
O(m + k + n)
O(mn + k log k)
O(mk + n)
O(mk + mn + k log k)

Table 3.1: Communication and computation complexities of FLDP compared with the state
of the art.

3. Analytic and empirical results that support our scalability claims, and that show
our protocol achieves nearly the same accuracy as central-model approaches for
differentially private deep learning on practical models for MNIST and CIFAR10.

3.2

Overview

We study the problem of distributed differentially private deep learning without a
trusted data curator. Our setting includes a set of clients (or data owners), each of
whom holds some sensitive data, and a server that aggregates gradients generated by
clients to obtain a model for the entire federation. The goal is to obtain a differentially
private model, without revealing any private data to either the server or other clients.

3.2.1

Background: General Problem Setting

Deep learning. Deep learning [48] attempts to train a neural network architecture
F(θ, ·) by training its parameters (or weights) θ in order to minimize the value of a
loss function L(θ, ·) on the training data. Advances in deep learning have lead to
significant gains in machine learning capabilities in recent years. Neural networks
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are typically trained via gradient descent: each iteration of training calculates the
gradient of the loss on a subset of the training data called a batch, and the model
parameters are updated based on the negation of the gradient.
Traditional deep learning techniques assume the training data is collected centrally; moreover, recent results suggest that trained models tend to memorize training data, and training examples can later be extracted from the trained model via
membership inference attacks [4, 5, 44, 49]. When sensitive data is used to train the
model, both factors represent significant privacy risks to data owners.
Federated learning. Federated learning is a family of techniques for training deep
neural networks without collecting the training data centrally. In the simplest form
of federated learning (also called distributed SGD), each client computes a gradient
locally and sends the gradient (instead of the training data) to the server. The server
averages the gradients and updates the model. More advanced approaches compute
gradients in parallel to reduce communication costs; Kairouz et al. [45] provide a
survey.
Differentially private deep learning. Differential privacy [6] is a rigorous privacy
framework that provides a solution to the problem of privacy attacks on deep learning
models. Achieving differential privacy typically involves adding noise to results to
ensure privacy. Abadi et al. [50] introduced DP-SGD, an algorithm for training deep
neural networks with differential privacy. DP-SGD adds noise to gradients before
each model update. Subsequent work has shown that this approach provides strong
privacy protection, effectively preventing membership inference attacks [4, 5, 49].
DP-SGD works in the central model of differential privacy—it requires the training
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data to be collected centrally (i.e. on a single server). The participant that holds the
data and runs the training algorithm is often called the data curator or server, and
in the central model, the server must be trusted. Central-model algorithms offer the
best accuracy of known approaches, at the expense of requiring a trusted server.
Federated learning with local differential privacy. The classical method to
eliminate a trusted server is local differential privacy [6], in which each client adds
noise to their own data before sending it to the server. Local differential privacy
algorithms for gradient descent have been proposed, but for deep neural networks,
this approach introduces too much noise to train useful models [51]. The major
strength of local differential privacy is the threat model: privacy is assured for each
client, even if every other client and the server act maliciously. The local model
of differential privacy has also been relaxed to the shuffle model [52, 53], which lies
between the local and central models but which has seem limited use in distributed
machine learning.
Secure aggregation. The difference in accuracy between the central and local
models raises the question: can cryptography help us obtain the benefits of both,
simultaneously? Several secure aggregation protocols have been proposed in the context of federated learning to answer this question in the affirmative. These approaches
yield the accuracy of the central model, but without a trusted server.
Secure aggregation protocols allow a group of clients—some of whom may be
controlled by a malicious adversary—to compute the sum of the clients’ privately-held
vectors (e.g. gradients, in federated learning), without revealing individual vectors.
The state-of-the-art protocol is due to Bonawitz et al. [1]. For k clients and length-m
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vectors, this protocol requires O(k 2 + mk) computation and O(k + m) communication
per client, and O(mk 2 ) computation and O(m2 +mk) communication for the untrusted
server. Bell et al. [2] improve these to O(log2 k + m log n) computation and O(log k +
m) communication (client) and O(k log2 k + km log k) computation and O(k log k +
km) communication (server). These complexity classifications are summarized in
Table 3.1.

3.2.2

Efficient Secure Aggregation in the Differential Privacy Setting

We present a new protocol for secure aggregation (detailed in Section 3.4) specifically for the setting of differentially private computations. Our protocol reduces
client communications complexity to O(m + k) and server communications complexity to O(mk), where as above we have k parties aggregating vectors of length m,
and demonstrates excellent concrete performance in our empirical evaluation (Section 3.5). These analytic results are summarized in Table 3.1 for easy comparison
with previous work.
Threat model. Like previous work, we target both the semi-honest setting (in
which all clients and the server correctly execute the protocol) and the malicious
setting (in which the server and some fraction of the clients may act maliciously).
These threat models are standard in the MPC literature [20], and match the ones
targeted by Bonawitz et al. [1] and Bell et al. [2]. In the semi-honest version, we
assume that the server is honest-but-curious, and that the clients have a corrupted
honest-but-curious subset with an honest majority. In the malicious version, we
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assume that the server is malicious, and that the clients have a corrupted malicious
subset with an honest majority. We present both versions in Section 3.4 (note that
the results in Table 3.1 are for semi-honest protocol versions in all cases).
Data poisoning & other threats. As with other secure aggregation protocols,
our threat model does not prevent the adversary from submitting maliciously-crafted
data. The ability to submit malicious data can enable attacks on the resulting trained
machine learning models, such as data poisoning [54], property inference [55] and
model inversion [56]. Like previous approaches for secure aggregation [1, 2], our protocol does not prevent these attacks.

3.2.3

Paper Roadmap

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.3 we describe the ideal but
insecure functionality of our main protocol that assumes a trusted server, along with
our threat model. The trusted server assumption is removed in Section 3.4 where we
present novel techniques for lightweight malicious-secure aggregation based on LWE.
In that Section we also describe the threat model and state formal security results
for the protocol, and analyze its algorithmic complexity. In Section 3.5 we discuss
methods and results for two experiments-one that further evaluates scalability and
other performance parameters, and another that evaluates the accuracy of the models
using our protocol. Section 3.6 reviews the relevant related work. We conclude with
a summary and remarks on open related problems in Section 3.7.
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3.3

Differentially Private Federated Learning

Abadi et al. [50] describe a differentially private algorithm for stochastic gradient
descent in the central model of differential privacy. The algorithm assumes that the
training data is collected centrally by a trusted curator, and training takes place on
a server controlled by the curator. For details of the algorithm the reader is referred
to [50]
The primary challenge in differentially private deep learning is in bounding the
sensitivity of the gradient computation. Abadi et al. [50] use the approach of computing per-example gradients—one for each example in the minibatch—then clipping
each gradient to have L2 norm bounded by the clipping parameter C (line 6). The
summation of the clipped gradients (line 7) has global L2 sensitivity bounded by C.
Our privacy analysis of this algorithm uses Rényi differential privacy (RDP) [19]
(rather than the moments accountant) for convenience and leverages parallel composition over the minibatches in each epoch (rather than privacy amplification by
subsampling). Otherwise, it is similar to that of Abadi et al. By the definition of the
Gaussian mechanism for Rényi differential privacy [19], the Gaussian noise added in


line 7 is sufficient to satisfy α,

C2α
2σ 2





-RDP. By RDP’s sequential composition theo-

rem, training for E epochs satisfies α,

EC 2 α
2σ 2



-RDP. Slightly tighter privacy analyses

have been developed [14, 34, 57] that also apply to our work. We present the RDP
analysis for simplicity, since our focus is not on improving central-model accuracy.
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Protocol 3: FLDP Protocol
Runs on the untrusted server
Input : Set of clients P , noise parameter σ, minibatch size b, learning rate
η, clipping parameter C, number of epochs E.
Output: Noisy model θ.


2

Privacy guarantee: satisfies α, ECσ2 α -RDP for α ≥ 1, assuming honest
majority of clients in each batch

1
2
3
4
5

θ ← random initialization
for E epochs do
for each batch of clients Pb ∈ P of size b do
G ← NoisyBatchGradient(Pb , σ, C, θ) θ := θ − 1b ηG
return θ

3.3.1

update model

FLDP: Distributed DP SGD

We now extend the central-model approach to the distributed setting. The following
describes a macro-level protocol for realizing differentially private distributed SGD
when a trusted third party is present. Functionality 4 (NoisyBatchGradient) assumes the existence of a trusted third party to aggregate the noisy gradients associated with a single batch. Section 3.4 will describe our MPC protocol that implements
Functionality 4 without a trusted third party.
Together, Protocol 3 and Functionality 4 define a differentially private distributed
SGD algorithm suitable for the trusted server setting.The distributed computation
follows the framework of McMahon et al. [1], in which each client computes a gradient
locally (Functionality 4, line 2). To satisfy differential privacy, our adaptation clips
each gradient and adds noise (lines 3-4).
Under the assumption that a trusted third party is available to compute Functionality 4, Protocol 3 satisfies differential privacy. Each execution of Functionality 4
calculates a sum of noisy gradients, each with Gaussian noise of scale
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σ
.
b

The final

Functionality 4: Distributed NoisyBatchGradient
Runs on a trusted third party
Input : Batch of clients Pb of size b, noise parameter σ, clipping parameter
C, current model θ.
Output: Noisy gradient Ĝ. 

2

Privacy guarantee: satisfies α, Cσ2α -RDP for α ≥ 1, assuming honest
majority of clients

Part 1: each client pi ∈ Pb computes a noisy gradient and sends it to the
functionality F.
1
2
3
4
5

for each client pi ∈ Pb do
gi ← ∇L(θ, dataOf(pi ))
ḡi ← gi / max(1, kgCi k2 )
2
ĝi ← ḡi + N (0, σb I)
pi sends ĝi to F

compute gradient
clip gradient
add noise

Part 2: F computes the sum of noisy gradients and releases it to the server.
6
7

sum individual gradients

Ĝ ← bi=1 ĝi
F sends Ĝ to the untrusted server
P

sum is:
Ĝ =

b
X
i=1

ĝi =

b 
X

ḡi + N (0,

i=1

σ2
I) =
b


X
b



ḡi + N (0, σ 2 I),

(3.1)

i=1

which is exactly the same as the central model algorithm [50]. The last step of
the derivation follows by the sum of Gaussian random variables. Note that the noise
added by each client is not sufficient for a meaningful privacy guarantee (it is only

1
b

of

the noise required). The privacy guarantee relies on the noise samples being correctly
summed along with the gradients. This is a major difference between Functionality 4
and approaches based on local differential privacy [51], in which each client adds
sufficient noise for privacy.
The privacy analysis for Functionality 4 and Protocol 3 are standard, based on
the conclusion of Equation (3.1). The L2 sensitivity of
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Pb

i=1



ḡi is C, since at most

one element of the summation may change, and it may change by at most C. By the
definition of the Gaussian mechanism for Rényi differential privacy, the noisy gradient


sum satisfies α,

C2α
2σ 2



-RDP. The batches are disjoint, so over E epochs of training,


each individual in the dataset incurs a total privacy loss of α,

3.3.2

EC 2 α
2σ 2



-RDP.

Security & Privacy Risks of FLDP

Protocol 3 satisfies differential privacy when a trusted third party is available to
execute Functionality 4. The server may be untrusted, since the server only receives
differentially private gradients.
Malicious clients. Functionality 4 is secure against semi-honest clients (in part
1), since each client only sees their own data and the (differentially private) model θ.
However, actively malicious clients may break privacy for other clients. Each client
is required to add noise to their own gradient (line 4); malicious clients may add no
noise at all.
If 50% of the clients add no noise, then the variance of the noise in the aggregated gradient Ĝ (line 6) will be

σ2
2



instead of σ , yielding α,
2

EC 2 α
σ2



-RDP (a weaker

guarantee than given above). As the fraction of malicious clients grows, the privacy
guarantee gets weaker. As discussed earlier, we assume an honest majority of
clients and relax our privacy guarantee to this weaker form.
No trusted third party. The larger problem is with the requirement for a trusted
third party to compute Part 2 of Functionality 4. Even an honest-but-curious server
breaks the privacy guarantee for this part: the server receives each individual gradient
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separately, and each one has only a small amount of noise added. This small amount
of noise is insufficient for a meaningful privacy guarantee. Section 3.4 describes an
MPC protocol that securely implements Functionality 4 in the presence of an actively
malicious server and an honest majority of clients.
Privacy analysis. The protocols we describe in Section 3.4 work for finite field
elements, so the floating-point numbers making up noisy gradients will need to be
converted to field elements. Our privacy analysis of Protocol 3 relies on a property of
the sum of Gaussian random variables; as Kairouz et al. [46] describe, this property
does not hold for discrete Gaussians. We amend the privacy analysis to address this
issue in Section 3.4.8.

3.4

LWE-Based Secure Aggregation

In this Section we address the security problem described in the last Section, i.e., that
state-of-the-art federated learning with differential privacy requires a trusted thirdparty server for aggregating gradients. Instead, we propose to use secure aggregation
between the clients of the protocol, eliminating the need for a trusted third-party
server. This allows us to keep both client inputs and gradients confidential for the
calculation of a differentially private aggregate gradient. Our solution is a secure
aggregation protocol that securely realizes Functionality 4 as part of Protocol 3.
Our approach is to build a LWE-based masking protocol that substantially reduces
the communication complexity required to add large vectors. Rather than applying
traditional secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols to the entire vector, we
generate masks that obscure the secret vectors based on the learning with errors
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problem. The masked vectors are safe to publish to the central server for aggregation
in the clear. The sum of all vector masks can be obtained through MPC among
the clients in the federation. Since the individual vector masks cannot be perfectly
reconstructed from the sum of all of the masks, the security of the learning with errors
problem safeguards the encryption of the masked vectors.
Due to the nature of the learning with errors problem, the individual vector masks
cannot be perfectly reconstructed with the sum of all the masks. The "errors" remain
in the aggregated vector sum, and are sufficient to satisfy (, δ)-differential privacy.

3.4.1

Background: Learning with Errors

To reduce the dimension of the vectors that are to be summed using MPC, we use a
technique whose security relies on the difficulty of the Learning With Errors (LWE)
problems [26]. These computational problems are usually posed in the following
manner: Let Fq be the finite field of prime size q, which is sometimes denoted GF (q),
and fix a secret vector s ∈ Fnq . An LWE sample is a pair (a, b), where a ∈ Fnq is chosen
uniformly at random, and
b = a · s + e ∈ Fq ,
where a · s denotes the usual dot product, and e is a so-called “error," chosen from
a suitable error distribution χ on Fq . Then the LWE (search) problem consists of
retrieving the secret s given a polynomial number of LWE samples (a, b).
For our purposes we will also need the hardness of the LWE decision problem,
which is the problem of distinguishing a set of pairs (a, b) with each pair chosen
uniformly at random from Fnq × Fq from a set of pairs that are LWE samples. In [26],
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Regev shows that when q is a prime of size polynomial in n and for χ any error
distribution on Fq , the LWE decision problem is at least as hard as the LWE search
problem. Since the reduction from the LWE decision to the LWE search problem is
trivial, in those cases the two problems are equivalent.

3.4.2

Background: Multiparty Computation

Secure Multiparty Computation, abbreviated MPC, refers to distributed protocols
where independent data owners use cryptography to compute a shared function output without revealing their private inputs to each other or a third party [20]. In
our setting, the ideal functionality computed by these clients is gradient aggregation,
which as discussed in Section 3.3 is differentially private with regard to user inputs.
Thus MPC serves to replace a trusted third party in secure function evaluation.
Security properties of Secure Aggregation protocols are categorized based on assumptions about the power of an adversary. Semi-Honest adversaries perform the
protocol as intended, while attempting to gain information about the private inputs
of the protocol. Malicious adversaries may exhibit arbitrary behaviors to affect the
security, correctness, or fairness of an MPC protocol. Furthermore, MPC protocols
must assume that some proportion of the involved clients are honest. FLDP assumes
an honest majority against a malicious adversary. For a group of size k, we assume
that

k
2

+ 1 clients are honest, and make no assumption about the behavior of the rest.

FLDP requires the realization of secure vector aggregation in order to add the secret keys each participant uses to mask their larger dimension vectors. Several secure
vector aggregation protocols already exist, especially for smaller sized vectors [1,2,11].
For the sake of consistent security and complexity analysis, we implement a secure
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vector aggregation protocol using Packed Shamir secret sharing [9]:
A (t, k, n) threshold secret sharing scheme will break k secret values into n shares,
and require at least t + k shares to recover the secret. Provided that an adversary
has access to fewer than t shares, packed Shamir sharing maintains the same perfect
security as traditional Shamir sharing [58]. To ensure perfect security, we choose
parameter settings that ensure the adversary will never have access to t or more
shares. Our secure vector aggregation protocol additionally requires that the scheme
have an additive homomorphic property. That is to say if [a] and [b] are secret
shares of values a and b, and c is a constant. Using [a], [b], and c, a party must be
able to calculate [a + b], [ac], and [a + c] without communication among the
other clients.

3.4.3

LWE-Based Masking of Input Vectors

We now describe our novel masking protocol, which allows us to reduce client communication. A high-level summary of the protocol is the following:
1. Each client generates a one-time-pad that is the same size as their gradient, masks
their gradient, and sends the encrypted gradient to the server.
2. Clients add their masks together using MPC and send the aggregate mask to the
server.
Through this protocol the server can recover the true sum of the gradients by adding
the masked gradients and subtracting the aggregate mask. Moreover, the aggregate
mask reveals nothing about any individual gradients or their masks.
We begin by assuming that all clients share a public set of m vectors chosen
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uniformly at random from Fnq , and we arrange these vectors as the rows of an m × n
. Then each client generates a secret vector s ∈ Fnq , with each entry
matrix A ∈ Fm×n
q
of the vector drawn from the distribution χ, and an error vector e ∈ Fm
q , with each
entry of the vector also drawn from the same distribution χ, and computes the vector
b = As + e ∈ Fm
q .
We can then think of the pair (A, b) as a set of m LWE samples, where each row of
A constitutes the first entry of a sample as described in Section 3.4.1, and each entry
of b constitutes the second entry of the sample. The hardness of the LWE decision
problem tells us that the vector b is indistinguishable from a vector whose entries are
chosen uniformly at random from Fq , so b can serve as a one-time pad to encrypt the
vector v ∈ Fm
q :
h = v + b,
where here h is used to denote the encrypted v. Note that according to Regev [26],
there is no loss in security in having all clients share the same matrix A to perform
this part of the protocol.
Now suppose that hi , vi , bi , si , and ei are the h, v, b, s, and e vectors of client i.
Additionally, suppose hsum , vsum , bsum , ssum and esum are the sum of all bi , si , and ei
for clients 0, . . . , k − 1 where k is the number of clients.
By the definition of one-time pads, each client can send hi to the server without revealing anything about vi . The server can obtain hsum through simple vector
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addition. By the definition of each hi , we further know that:
hsum = vsum + bsum ,
and by the definition of each bi and the distributive property, we obtain:
hsum = vsum + Assum + esum ,
where Assum denotes the usual matrix-vector multiplication. To obtain ssum we assume the federation has access to a secure aggregation protocol that realizes functionality Sagg(x0 , . . . xk , t). Sagg returns the sum of vectors x0 , . . . , xk , while not
revealing any information about any inputs to any subset of parties of size smaller
than t. Because they utilize Sagg, this reveals nothing about their individual si values. In the case of dropouts, Sagg also returns the subset of parties that participated
in the aggregation. Using ssum , the server can compute the following value:

vsum + esum
Of course, the clients do not share their individual error vector ei values because this
would invalidate the LWE assumption that ensures bi is a one-time pad. Therefore,
we realize the ideal functionality of calculating vsum by returning a noisy answer. Fortunately, each entry in esum is the sum of at most k discretized Gaussians. Therefore
we can use the noise added by esum to satisfy (, δ)-DP.
Protocol 5 reduces the client communication complexity from O(log(q)mk) to
O(log(q)(m + n + k)) by requiring clients to securely aggregate only a small vector of
size n. The addition of n and k can be attributed to the possible use of packed secret
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Protocol 5: Masking Aggregation
Input : Set U of k clients, each client i has a vector vi ∈ Fm
q , the secret
.
length n, an error distribution χ, and a common matrix A ∈ Fm×n
q
Output: The sum of all vectors v0 . . . vk−1 , V
Round 1: Each client i:
1. generates a vector si ∈ Fnq , with each entry drawn at random from χ, using a
secret seed.
2. generates ei ∈ Fm with each entry drawn at random from χ.
3. bi ← Asi + ei
4. hi ← vi + bi
5. sends hi to the server.
Round 2: The server:
1. receives hi from each non-dropped out client
2. the server sends each party the set of clients who sent an h. Call this set U1 .
Round 3: Each client i:
1. Obtains s ← i∈U1 si . Using Sagg({si |i ∈ U1 }, t) and U2 , the set of clients
that participated in Sagg.
2. sends s, U2 to server.
P

Round 4: The server:
1. H ← i∈U2 hi
2. V ← H − As
P
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sharing. Each client shares their length-m vector once with the server, and then uses
a packed secret sharing scheme on their length-n vector. The total number of shares
required in the packed scheme is O(n + k)

3.4.4

Vector Aggregation

To add the secret vectors s0 . . . sk−1 , we can use any secure aggregation protocol. In
our use cases, each si is typically of small dimension (m ≤ 800), so we use a packed
Shamir secret sharing protocol outlined in Protocol 6.
Protocol 6: Secure Vector Addition
Input : k vectors vi ∈ Fnq , one from each client Pi , a secret sharing
threshold t, a packing threshold p < k − t − 1.
Output: vector sum V ∈ Fnq
Round 1: Each client j:
1. partitions vj into a set of length-p vectors Rj
2. Generates a set of (t − p + 1, t + 1, p, k)-packed secret sharing called Sj with
one sharing for each vector in Rj .
3. Distributes the shares of each sharing in Sj to clients P0 . . . Pk−1 . For a given
sharing s in Sj , Pi receives sij .
Round 2: Each client j:
1. Receives shares sj0 , . . . sjk−1 from P0 , . . . Pk−1 for all sharings in S.
P
2. sumj ← sj0 , . . . , sjk−1 for each sharing in S.
3. Broadcasts each sumj to every client.
Round 3: Each client j:
1. Receives sum0 . . . sumk−1 for each sharing in S.
2. Runs reconstruct on each element sum0 . . . sumk−1 to obtain a set of
length-p vectors Rsum .
3. if (2) fails, broadcast ABORT.
4. concatenate the vectors in Rsum to obtain V .

Protocol 6 is secure against semi-honest adversaries based on the security of packed
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secret sharing. A malicious adversary could broadcast an incorrect sum in Round 2
of the protocol, and the final result would be calculated incorrectly by the other
clients. Traditionally, the reconstruct function has no ability to catch this kind of
cheating; in many cases all of the shares are needed to reach the threshold during
reconstruction, so corruption of a single one will change the result.

3.4.5

Malicious-Secure Vector Aggregation

We now extend Protocol 6 to be secure against malicious clients by applying a variation of Benaloh’s verifiable secret scheme [59]. The key insight behind this modification comes from the observation that in our protocol each client receives k shares
from the other clients in Round 3, but only t shares are actually required for reconstruction. Our modified reconstruction procedure uses the remaining shares to catch
cheating clients.
Algorithm 7: Shamir Reconstruction with Verification
Input : Let [a] be a (t, k)-Shamir sharing of secret a. Assume one client has
access to at least t + 1 shares of [a].
Output: a or ABORT
1 A ⊂ B ⊆ [a] where |A| = t and |B| = t + 1.
0
2 a → reconstruct(A)
3 b → reconstruct(B )
0
4 if a = b then
5
return a’
6 else
7
return ABORT
We propose the following reconstruction method for verifying that clients have
behaved honestly. Requiring that each client has at least t + 1 shares, we have each
honest client take two subsets of the shares, one of size t and one of size t + 1.
The clients perform the traditional reconstruction technique on both subsets. If the
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values returned by both reconstructions are equivalent, they accept the result as
correct. Otherwise, they abort. The modified reconstruction procedure appears in
Algorithm 7. Replacing the call to reconstruct in Protocol 6 with a call to this
modified reconstruction procedure yields a malicious-secure protocol.
Note that Algorithm 7 does not require communication with other clients. Generalpurpose malicious-secure protocols based on the same principle require interaction
between the clients to check for cheating (e.g., the protocol of Chida et al. [60]) because they use the “extra” shares to perform multiplication. Since our application
does not require multiplication, we can use these shares to catch cheating instead.
Algorithm 7 can be extended to the packed Shamir variant by requiring that
each client has access to t + k + 1 shares. The number of shares to which access is
required must be increased because the reconstruction threshold is increased in the
packed variant. Protocol 6 and Algorithm 7 realize the ideal functionality Sagg in
the malicious adversary threat model.

3.4.6

Security Analysis

Here we analyze the security of Protocol 5, which we will denote as π.
Suppose the ideal functionality of noisy vector addition as F , an adversary A. Let
vi and xi be input and view of client i respectively. Let xs be the view of the server.
n is the LWE security parameter. Suppose a maliciously secure aggregation protocol
Sagg(X, t). Let V be the output of π.

Let U be the set of clients. Let C ⊂ U ∪ {S} be the set of corrupt parties, and
D ⊂ U be the set of dropped out parties. The set of honest parties is H = U \(C ∪D).
In this proof, we consider the dropped out parties as a part of the adversary
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without loss of generality.
Theorem 1. There exists a PPT simulator SIM such that for all U , |C| ≤ γ|U |, and
|D| ≤ δ|U |

REALπ,A (n; xH ) ≡ IDEALF,SIM (n, xH )

The intuition behind this statement is that no such adversary can exist on our
protocol that is more powerful than an adversary against the ideal functionality.
The proof full proof of this theorem can be found in Appendix 3.8.
LWE parameters
The security of an LWE instance is parameterized by the tuple (n, q, β) where n is the
width of the matrix A (or equivalently the dimension of the secret s), q is the field size,
and β is such that βq is the width of the error distribution χ (so that the standard
deviation is σ =

√βq ;
2π

this quantity is denoted α in the LWE literature, but we choose

β here so as to not conflict with the notation for Rényi divergence). We used the LWE
estimator [28] to calculate the security of each parameter tuple. Table 3.2 displays a
series of LWE parameters for different potential aggregation scenarios, each with at
least 128 bits of security.
The different parameter settings are driven by different sizes of q, which would
enable more precision in the aggregate values. A larger field size also allows more
clients to be involved in the aggregation. Field sizes picked here may also utilize
fast Fourier transform secret sharing. For this reason we consider q fixed by the
application of the protocol. Since we also use a fixed valued of β =

3.2
,
q

the security

offered by the LWE problem depends on the variable n (the length of the secret s),
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which we call the security parameter.

3.4.7

Encoding and Decoding Gradients

In order to manipulate gradients with MPC, we require that they can be encoded as a
vector of finite field elements. First we flatten the tensors that compose each gradient
into a vector of floating point numbers. The aggregation operation of gradients is
element wise. Therefore, we simplify the encoding problem to encoding a floating
point number as a finite field element. Gradient elements are clipped, and encoded
as fixed point numbers. We chose 16 bit numbers with 4 digits of precision after
the decimal. This precision was sufficient for model conversion on the MNIST and
CFAR-10 problems.
The integers are converted to unsigned integers using an offset, and the unsigned
integer result can be encoded into any field larger than 216 . The fields used in our
experiment are outlined in Table 3.2.

3.4.8

Malicious Secure FLDP

We now have all the MPC operations necessary to implement our ideal functionality
from Protocol 3 as a secure multiparty computation. Protocol 8 securely implements
Functionality 4, and can replace it directly to implement FLDP. This version of
NoisyBatchGradient computes the gradient and adds noise to it in the same way

as the ideal functionality, but invokes Protocol 6 to sum the vectors. This requires
encoding each noisy gradient as a vector of field elements, as described in the last
section.
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Protocol 8: Malicious-Secure NoisyBatchGradient
Input : Batch of clients Pk of size k, noise parameter σ, clipping parameter
C, current model θ.
Output: Noisy gradient Ĝ. 

2

Privacy guarantee: satisfies α, Cσ2α -RDP for α ≥ 1, assuming honest
majority of clients

1
2
3
4
5

for each client pi ∈ Pk do
gi ← ∇L(θ, dataOf(pi ))
ḡi ← gi / max(1, kgCi k2 )
2
ĝi ← ḡi + N (0, σk I)
vi ← EncodeGradient(gˆi )

compute gradient
clip gradient
add noise
encode gradient

Client pi ∈ Pk provides vi as input to Secure Vector Addition (Protocol 6).
P
Together, the clients compute Ĝ = ki=1 ĝi . Ĝ is released to the untrusted
server.
Privacy analysis. The privacy analysis of Protocol 3 relies on the fact that the
sum of Gaussian random variables is itself a Gaussian random variable. However, as
Kairouz et al. [46] point out, this property does not hold for discrete Gaussians—
and since EncodeGradient uses a fixed-point representation for noisy gradients, we
cannot rely on the summation property. Instead, our privacy analysis proceeds based
on Proposition 14 of Kairouz et al. [46]:
Proposition 1 (from Kairouz et al. [46]). Let σ ≥ 21 . Let Xi,j ← NZ (0, σ 2 ) independently for each i and j. Let Xi = (Xi,1 , . . . , Xi,d ) ∈ Zd . Let Zn =

Pn

i=1

Xi ∈ Zd .

Then, for all ∆ ∈ Zd and all α ∈ [1, ∞),
Dα (Zn ||Zn + ∆) ≤
where τ := 10 ·

Pn−1 −2π2 σ2 k
k+1
k=1

e

αk∆k22
+ τd
2nσ 2

.

Proposition 1 provides a bound on Rényi divergence, Dα , for noise generated
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as the sum of discrete Gaussians, which directly implies Rényi differential privacy.
In our setting, Proposition 1 yields almost identical results to the privacy analysis
of Protocol 3 (which assumes continuous Gaussians). Note that the first term of
the bound from Proposition 1 is identical to the bound given in our earlier privacy
analysis, when n is equal to the batch size b and k∆k22 is equal to C 2 (where C is the
L2 clipping parameter).
As the fixed-point representation of noisy gradients becomes more precise, the
second term of the bound (τ d) becomes extremely small. The EncodeGradient
function uses 4 places of precision past the decimal point, meaning that the effective
values of σ 2 and k∆k22 are 10,000 times their “original” values. Each additional place
of precision adds another factor of 10 to both values. This has the effect of reducing
the value of τ to extremely close to zero.
We have implemented both the original analysis (which incorrectly assumes continuous Gaussians) and Proposition 1. The results reported in Section 3.5 use Proposition 1, but the two methods yield values of  so close together that the resulting
graphs are indistinguishable.

3.4.9

Algorithmic Complexity

Client computation is comprised of three tasks. Generating a random vector s of
length n, generating a random vector e of length m, multiplying s by m × n matrix
A, and generating secret shares for s. Random vector generation is an O(m + n)
operation where n is length of secret vector s and m is the length of e. This can
be reduced to O(m) because m will be larger than n in any practical use of FLDP.
Matrix multiplication by a vector is an O(mn) operation where m is the vector size;
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each matrix element is considered exactly once. Finally, secret share generation is
done using the packed FFT method [61], and therefore has a complexity of O(k log(k))
where k is the number of clients. In sum, this gives us a runtime of O(mn + k log(k))
for client computation with respect to our vector size m and s length n.
In order to assume the difficulty of the LWE decision problem, we require that
q be polynomial in n. Though the field size does affect the precision of the values
to be aggregated and the possible number of parties to the aggregation scheme, it
is customary to think of q as a constant, and therefore n is constant here too in
our complexity analysis. However, in practice it is possible to choose n quite small
relative to q.
Server complexity consists of adding k masked vectors, reconstructing the packed
secret sharing, and multiplying an m × n matrix by a length n vector. The vector
addition and matrix multiplication have complexity O(mk + m log(k)). Reconstructing the packed secret shares takes time O(k log(k)) in the semi-honest case with no
dropouts using the Fast Fourier Transform method. In the case of malicious security
and dropouts, we use Lagrange interpolation to obtain a runtime of O(k 2 ). The number of dropouts does not affect runtime complexity as long as there are more than 0
dropouts. In total, the server runtime complexity is O(mk + mn + k log(k)) in the no
dropout scenario, and O(mk + mn + k 2 ) in case of dropouts or malicious adversaries.

3.5

Evaluation

Our empirical evaluation aims to answer two research questions:
• RQ1: How does the concrete performance of FLDP compare to state-of-the-art
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Figure 3.1: The left figure displays the expansion factor for using our protocol with various
vector sizes and numbers of clients, comparing our approach (solid lines) against the secure
aggregation protocol of Bonawitz et al. [1] (dashed lines). The right figure includes cost of a
single client’s computation. The client timing results are identical regardless of the dropout
so only the dropout situation is plotted.

secure aggregation?
• RQ2: Is FLDP capable of training accurate models?
We conduct two experiments to answer both questions in the affirmative. We first
describe our experiment setup and the datasets used in our evaluation. Section 3.5.1
describes our scalability experiment; the results show that FLDP scales to realistic
batch sizes, and that model updates take only seconds. Section 3.5.2 describes our
accuracy experiment; the results demonstrate that FLDP trains models with comparable accuracy to central-model differentially private training algorithms.
Experiment setup. Our experiments take place in two phases. First, the model
is trained in a single process with privacy preserving noise added to each gradient.
As model training occurs, gradients for each training sample are written to file. The
second phase involves the MPC simulation. Clients read their noisy gradients from
file, and aggregate them using FLDP.
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This experimental setup is necessary for the implementation of local experiments
with batch sizes of 128. Reading each gradient from file sidesteps the need for each
client to have their own TensorFlow instance, substantially reducing our memory
consumption footprint.
Running these two separate experiments ensures that the MPC results reflect
the performance of FLDP without considering the overhead of training 128 separate
neural networks in parallel.
The memory consumption issue described here is created by simulating many
clients on the same machine. In a true federated learning instance, each client would
have their own independent resources, and therefore would not run into this same
issue.

3.5.1

Experiment 1: Masking Scalability

This section strives to answer RQ1. We implemented the masking protocol in single
threaded python and evaluated various federation configurations. Experiments were
run on an AWS z1d2xlarge instance with a 4.0Ghz Intel Xeon processor and 64 Gb
of RAM [62]. Concrete timing and expansion results for protocol computation are
included in Figures 3.1, 3.2, and Table 3.2. We assume semi-honest behavior from
the adversary and consider the scenario with no dropouts as well as a 25% dropout
rate. In all experiments, β is assumed to be 3.2/q. We assume a single aggregation
server, and we assume that clients broadcast the sum of shares to the server rather
than performing Shamir reconstruction themselves.
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Experimental Performance
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 presents our concrete performance results. We see a significant
improvement in client and server computation time over the concrete performance
results of Bonawitz et al. [1]. Client computation takes less than half a second for all
configurations tested, and is dictated by a linear relationship with the vector size.
Server computation time has a linear relationship with vector size and a quadratic
relationship with the number of clients. In the case with no dropouts, server computation is quick, taking less than 5 seconds for all configurations tested. In the dropout
scenario, server computation is significantly slower, but still much faster than the
state of the art [1].
Server time is dominated by the Lagrange interpolation process used for reconstruction. The no dropout case has no lagrange interpolation, the dropout model
uses lagrange interpolation once, and the malicious protocol performs two rounds of
lagrange interpolation. Figure 3.2 shows that the malicious protocol requires about
twice as much time as the dropout friendly protocol. This is because of lagrange interpolation. Performance can be improved with faster interpolation algorithms [63].
Recall the quantity β from Section 3.4.6, which given q the size of the field gives
us the standard deviation of the noise. We observe that changing β has no effect
on the runtime. We note that changing β can require different values for n and q to
guarantee a certain amount of security, but this is only necessary if β is decreased. For
our timing experiments we chose β = 3.2/q to accommodate a wide variety of privacy
budgets for relatively small fixed precision. Because our values are fixed precision
with 4 decimal places, the chosen value of β adds noise with standard deviation .0409
to our aggregated vectors assuming 128 clients. This is far less than the minimum
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Figure 3.2: The effects of different federation size and different vector size on server computation time malicious, semi-honest, and dropout tolerant threat models. The malicious
threat model tolerates dropouts.

Clients

q

n

% Dropout

Server

Client

[1] Server

[1] Client

478
625
1000

31352833
41057281
71663617

710
730
750

0
0
0

310
447
668

80
84
88

2018
2018
4887

849
849
1699

478
625
1000

31352833
41057281
71663617

710
730
750

29
29
29

496
375
21931

91
93
99

143389
143389
413767

849
849
1699

Table 3.2: Client and server times for various LWE configurations. Vector size is fixed at
100, 000 and βq = 3.2. Times are in milliseconds. Results from Bonawitz et al. [1] for 500
and 1000 parties with 0 and 30% dropout are included for comparison.

amount of DP-noise we added in our accuracy experiments, which had a standard
deviation of 1.

3.5.2

Experiment 2: Model Accuracy

This section strives to answer RQ2. We implement our models in TensorFlow. To
preserve privacy, we add noise scaled to a constant σ to each example’s gradient, which
results in the batch gradient described by Equation 3.1. Each gradient is clipped, by
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Property

MNIST

CIFAR-10

Train Set Size
Test Set Size
# Conv layers
# Parameters
Batch Sizes
σ

60,000
10,000
2
26,000
16, 32, 64, 128
0, 1, 2, 4, 8

50,000
10,000
6
550,000
16, 32, 64, 128
0, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16

Table 3.3: Datasets and model configurations used in our experiments

a constant C = 5 such that batch gradient sensitivity is bounded by C/batch_size.
These two modifications to a traditional neural network training loop ensure that our
models satisfy differential privacy. Adding noise in this way also accurately reflects the
process that would be used by a federation member using FLDP. Gradient updates
for individual samples are saved during training for use during the MPC experiments.
We evaluate the accuracy and scalability of FLDP with the standard MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets. Both datasets, and the models we train with them are listed in
Table 3.3.
For both the MNIST and CIFAR-10 models, we utilize categorical cross entropy
for our loss function, stochastic gradient descent with a learning rate of 0.01 and
momentum of 0.9 for our optimizer and a clipping parameter C = 5 for all trials.
We run a series of trials for each dataset with each pair of batch size and σ listed
in Table 3.3. All accuracy results are the per epoch average of 4 trials with the given
model configuration.  is calculated post hoc as a function of σ, C, batch_size, epochs.
All  values are calculated from the corresponding Rényi differential privacy guarantee
by picking α to minimize the RDP  parameter, then converting this guarantee into
(, δ)-differential privacy with δ = 10−5 . We see selected accuracy results reported for
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differing values of  in Figure 3.3.
MNIST
The Modified National Institute of Standards and Technology database is an often
used image recognition benchmark consisting of 60,000 training samples and 10,000
testing samples; each sample is a 28 × 28 gray scale image of a handwritten digit.
We train a classifier containing 2 ReLU-activated convolution layers, max pooling
following each of them, and a ReLU activated dense layer with 32 nodes. Finally,
classifications are done with a softmax layer. This model has about 26,000 trainable
parameters in total.

Figure 3.3: Validation accuracy progression over training runs on MNIST and CIFAR for
various values of  (δ = 10−5 ). All accuracy values are the average of 4 trials. Batch size
is restricted to 64.

After training for 275 epochs, our private MNIST models are able to attain a
maximum 98.7% mean validation accuracy over 4 trials. This is a slight decrease in
accuracy from the no noise baseline accuracy of 99.2%, however the private model still
generalizes very well. Figure 3.4 shows how different privacy budgets affect accuracy
for our sample batch sizes. Models trained with all batch sizes see improved accuracy
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as  increases, however larger batch sizes tend to produce more accurate models,
especially for small values of . Improved accuracy for larger batch sizes can be seen
as an effect of the private average, where the sensitivity of the gradient average is
inversely proportional to the batch size. Therefore, larger batches require less noise
added for a given privacy budget, resulting in a more accurate model.

Figure 3.4: The effects of privacy budget and batch size on validation accuracy (δ = 10−5 ).
Each solid line is a moving average of Accuracy as epsilon increases for a given batch size.
The dotted line is the maximum accuracy achieved by our model with no noise added during
training. Private federated learning is able to approach non-private accuracy for several
batch sizes on MNIST. On CIFAR-10 e see that private models tend to be more accurate
with larger batch sizes, while the opposite is true for non-private models.

CIFAR-10
The Canadian Institute for Advanced Research 10 dataset consists of 60,000 colored
images equally partitioned into 10 classes. Each image is 32 × 32 with 3 channel
RGB colored pixels. We separated the dataset into 50,000 training examples and
10,000 test samples for our experiment. Our trained model contains three pairs of
ReLU-activated convolution layers with batch normalization after each layer, and max
pooling after each pair. We also include one ReLU activated dense layer with 128
nodes, and a softmax activated output layer. This model contains 550,000 parameters.
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Method

Abadi et. al. [50]

FLDP

MNIST ( ≤ 2)
MNIST ( ≤ 8)
CIFAR-10 ( ≤ 4)
CIFAR-10 ( ≤ 8)

95%
97%
70%
73%

95%
99%
70%
70%

Table 3.4: A comparison of our private model accuracy with a central-model differentially
private training algorithm. For all models, δ = 10−5 . For all of our models, batch size is
64.

With a batch size of 64, we achieve a maximum accuracy of 70.0% mean validation accuracy over 4 trials on CIFAR-10. This is a sizeable drop in accuracy
compared to the 77.4% mean accuracy of our architecture trained without differential privacy, however it is in line with differentially private model performance in the
central model [50].
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the correlation between larger batch size and greater
accuracy when controlling for a specific privacy budget. As with MNIST, the greater
accuracy with larger batch sizes likely stems from gradient sensitivity being dependent
on the batch size itself. That said, for  < 10, we achieve our most accurate model
with a batch size of 64 ( = 3.67), which is well within the scalable limits of FLDP
as defined in Section 3.5.1.
Comparison With Centralized Differential Privacy
Our approach produces models with accuracy highly comparable to those achieved
by Abadi et. al. [50]. Table 3.4 shows that for a given privacy budget, our approach
is able to produce an output within 3% of the equivalent central-model accuracy. It is
worth noting that we report the average of 4 trials in this table, and that we observe
the same, or better, decrease in accuracy with respect to the no-noise baseline for
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each model. These comparable accuracy results demonstrate the usability of FLDP
for privacy preserving federated learning.

3.6

Related Work

Secure multiparty computation. Secure multiparty computation (MPC) [20]
is a family of techniques that enable mutually distrustful parties to collaboratively
compute a function of their distributed inputs without revealing those inputs. MPC
techniques include garbled circuits [24] (which is most easily applied in the two-party
case) and approaches based on secret sharing [11] (which naturally apply in the nparty case). MPC approaches have seen rapid improvement over the past 20 years, but
scalability remains a challenge for practical deployments. In particular, most MPC
protocols work best when the number of parties is small (e.g., 2 or 3), and costs grow
at least quadratically with the number of parties. State-of-the-art protocols support
significantly more parties: Wang et al. [64] reach 128 parties using a garbled circuits
approach, and Chida et al. [60] reach 110 parties using a secret sharing approach.
MPC for differentially private deep learning. MPC techniques have been previously applied to the problem of differentially private deep learning, but these approaches require either a semi-honest data curator [39] or two non-colluding data
curators [40]. Secure aggregation protocols [1, 2] (detailed in Section 3.2) are themselves MPC protocols, specifically designed for the many-client setting. Kairouz et
al. [46] present a general framework for differentially private federated learning that
leverages existing secure aggregation protocols.
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Security for distributed differential privacy. Outside of deep learning, several systems have been proposed for computing differentially private results from
distributed data. Honeycrisp [65] and Orchard [66] are most related to our work,
and use a distributed protocol similar to secure aggregation to compute the results
of database-style queries. ShrinkWrap [67] and Crypt [68] leverage existing MPC
frameworks to implement differentially private database queries.
Secure and Private Federated Learning. MPC and Differential privacy may
also be applied to the problem of Federated Learning separately. Several local differential privacy approaches have been proposed [69,70]. These approaches add sufficient
noise to a client’s gradient before performing aggregation in the clear, thus circumventing the need for MPC. In this way LDP-based approaches scale to large federations
quite well, but typically require very large privacy budgets for model convergence.
MPC techniques can be applied to federated learning to satisfy a variety of properties. POSEIDON [71] and So et. al [72] use MPC for substantially more robust threat
models, N − 1 adversaries and Byzantine resistance respectively, but do not utilize
differential privacy, and focus on smaller federations (< 50 parties) than FLDP. EIFFeL [73] on the other hand, employs non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs to ensure
the integrity of masked inputs. These approaches can prevent some additional attacks
we do not consider (e.g. data poisoning), but are designed for smaller federations.
Learning with Errors. As noted in Sections 3.4.6 and 3.5.1, in this work we fix
βq = 3.2. We note that the security reductions that ensure that the LWE search
problem is difficult do not apply in this case: In [26], Regev shows that if q is chosen
to be polynomial in n, and χ is a certain discretization of a Gaussian distribution on
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Fq with standard deviation

√βq
2π

√
for 0 < β < 1 and βq > 2 n, then solving the LWE

search problem can be quantumly reduced to an algorithm that approximately solves
the Shortest Vector Problem and the Shortest Independent Vectors problem. In [74],
Peikert shows a classical reduction to the (slightly easier) GapSVP problem.
While as far as we know there are no security reductions for small fixed βq, at
the same time we do not currently know of an attack that takes advantage of a small
constant standard deviation. Accordingly, our choice is similar to the choice made in
the current FrodoKEM algorithm specifications (submission to Round 3 of the NIST
PQC challenge) [75, 76] and consistent with the recommendation of [77].

3.7

Conclusion

In the past decade, an explosion in data collection has led to huge strides forward
in machine learning, but the use of sensitive personal data in machine learning also
represents a serious privacy concern. We present an approach based on a new protocol
called FLDP that ensures differential privacy for the trained model, without the need
for a trusted data aggregator. Using FLDP allows a highly accurate model to be
trained in a federated (distributed) manner while guaranteeing the privacy of data
owners, even against powerful and colluding adversaries. Our empirical results show
that these accurate models are trainable within a feasible time frame for practical
applications, especially when accuracy and low trust burdens are critical.
The promising results presented in our evaluation also suggest directions for future research. For example, gradient compression techniques can substantially reduce
in-communication overhead for distributed training [78]. Paired with FLDP, these
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techniques could further reduce the time per batch for larger models, and potentially
improve our scalability with respect to model complexity. Moreover, we apply FLDP
to the very specific case of privacy preserving federated learning, but additional research could consider how these techniques scale with simpler, yet important, data
problems. For example, the core noise addition and secure aggregation methods described in this paper could be adapted to privacy-preserving database queries, while
eliminating the need for a central database.

3.8

Proof of security

Suppose the ideal functionality of noisy vector addition as F , an adversary A. Let vi
and xi be input and view of client i respectively. Let xs be the view of the server.
n is the LWE security parameter. Suppose a maliciously secure aggregation protocol
Sagg(X, t). Let V be the output of π.

Let U be the set of clients. Let C ⊂ U ∪ {S} be the set of corrupt parties, and
D ⊂ U be the set of dropped out parties. The set of honest parties is H = U \(C ∪D).
In this proof, we consider the dropped out parties as a part of the adversary
without loss of generality.
Theorem 2. There exists a PPT simulator SIM such that for all U , |C| ≤ γ|U |, and
|D| ≤ δ|U |

REALπ,A (n; xH ) ≡ IDEALF,SIM (n, xH )

The intuition behind this statement is that no such adversary can exist on our
protocol that is more powerful than an adversary against the ideal functionality.
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Proven through the hybrid argument. We assume that any honest party will
ABORT if they receive an ill-formed message, an untimely message, or an abort
from any other party. Furthermore, we assume secure channels between each pair of
parties.
1. This hybrid is a random variable distributed exactly like REALπ,A (n; xH )
2. In this hybrid SIM has access to {xi |i ∈ U }. SIM runs the full protocol and
outputs a view of the adversary from the previous hybrid.
3. In this hybrid, SIM has corrupt parties receive an ABORT if the server sends a
U1 such that t > |U1 |.
4. In this hybrid, SIM replaces V with the output of F from any xC .
5. In this hybrid, SIM generates the ideal inputs of the corrupt and dropout parties
using a separate simulator SIMg . These sets of inputs, xC and xD , contain a
vector of field elements or ⊥ for each corrupt or dropout party respectively.
Through this process, SIMg may force the output of F to be any field element
or ⊥. Thus SIMg is able to produce the same protocol outputs that A is able to
in REAL, so this hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous hybrid.
6. In this hybrid, SIM replaces s, the sum of secret vectors with a vector of random
field elements distributed by χ∗k. Because s is not used to reconstruct G, and is
normally distributed by χ ∗ k, this hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous
hybrid.
7. In this hybrid, SIM replaces H with V + As.
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8. In this hybrid, SIM replaces the run of protocol Sagg with the ideal simulation
of Sagg. If Sagg returns ABORT, SIM returns ABORT. Because Sagg is secure,
this hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous hybrid using each parties si
as input.
9. In this hybrid, SIM replaces the si of each client with a vector of elements
distributed by χ. Because si is typically distributed by χ and each si is not
used to compute s anymore, this hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous
hybrid.
10. In this hybrid, SIM replaces the bi of each client with a vector of uniformly
distributed field elements in Fm
q . Given the LWE assumption, bi should be
indistinguishable from random field elements, so this hybrid is indistinguishable
from the previous hybrid from the perspective of the adversary.
11. In this hybrid, SIM replaces hi of each client with a vector of uniformly distributed field elements in Fq . By the definition of one time pad, this hybrid
should be indistinguishable from the previous hybrid. Additionally this hybrid
does not use any input from the honest parties and thus concludes the proof.
After these steps, the simulator no longer needs any input from the honest clients
to simulate Protocol 5, implying that it is secure in the malicious threat model.
Notably, our malicious threat model subsumes the semi-honest threat model.
Therefore this proof proves security in that threat model as well. In the case of
a semi-honest threat model, the security of Sagg can also eased to semi-honest.
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Chapter 4
Secret Sharing Sharing

4.1

Intro

Efficient secure aggregation protocols allow distributed data owners (clients) to aggregate secret inputs, revealing only the aggregated output to a (possibly untrusted)
server. Secure aggregation protocols can be used to build privacy-preserving distributed systems, including systems for data analytics [65] and federated machine
learning [45, 46].
The state-of-the-art large vector aggregation protocol [1] leverages masks—one
time pads created with shared random seeds—to encrypt and decrypt the vectors.
This reduces communication among parties substantially. Bell et al. [2] further reduce
communication cost by circumventing the need for a complete communication graph.
Rather than sharing a random seed with every other party, each party shares merely
with O(log n) neighbors.
However, masking-based protocols incur significant communications overhead for
short vectors. For a vector of size 100, the Bonawitz protocol results in an expansion
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Setting
Client Communication
Client Computation
Server Communication
Server Computation

Bonawitz et al. [1]
O(n + l)
O(n2 + nl)
O(n2 + nl)
O(ln2 )

Bell et al. [2]
O(log n + l)
O(log2 n + l log n)
O(n log n + nl)
O(n log2 n + nl log n)

SHARD
O(l log n)
O(l log2 n)
O(ln)
O(ln)

Table 4.1: Communication and computation complexities of SHARD compared with the
state of the art, for n parties aggregating vectors of size l.

factor equal to the number of neighbors per party. Expansion factor measures the
client communication cost relative to the size of their private inputs. Such a large
expansion factor implies that masking protocols provide little to no benefit over the
naïve solution with small vectors. In the case of dropouts, both protocols undergo a
costly unmasking procedure that takes several minutes of server computation time.
In this paper, we propose SHARD, a highly scalable secure aggregation protocol
with dropout robustness. SHARD is the first sublinear communication complexity
protocol to handle dropouts without a recovery communication phase. Table 4.1
presents the computation and communication complexity of SHARD along with those
of the current state-of-the-art for large federation secure aggregation.
We start with a natural approach to reducing communication complexity: n clients
organize into groups of size O(log n), aggregate within their groups, and reveal the
group’s sum to the server. Unfortunately, this approach reveals each group’s sum to
the server, and the sum of inputs within a small group reveals much more information
than the total sum over all n clients.
Our approach addresses this problem via sharding. Sharding is a technique borrowed from distributed databases [79–81] and scalable blockchains [82] where a piece
of information is fragmented into pieces (called shards) to enhance a desired property
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(in our case, security). In our SHARD protocol, each client splits their input into
m ≥ 2 shards, such that each shard in isolation reveals nothing about the input. For
shard number i, the clients organize into groups of size O(log n), sum their ith shards
using a simple secure aggregation protocol, and reveal the group’s ith shard sum to
the server. The key insight of SHARD is that the sum of a group’s ith shard reveals
nothing about the sum of the original inputs, as long as different groups are used for
each shard.
For m shards, SHARD requires each client to participate in m instances of a
simple secure aggregation protocol with only O(log n) other clients, matching the
communication complexity of the state-of-the-art protocol [2]. In most cases, m = 2
provides sufficient security. Because it is based on threshold secret sharing, SHARD
is robust to dropouts modulo a minimal threshold for construction of the output.
In addition to complexity analysis, our formal results include malicious security
of SHARD in a real-ideal model. We have also implemented SHARD and performed
an empirical evaluation of its performance, demonstrating concrete efficiency of our
approach: the computation time for both client and server are less than 100ms, even
for federations of size 100 million. SHARD also provides a significant improvement in
concrete communications cost compared to Bell et al. [2], as measured by expansion
factor—especially for small private inputs. Moreover, in the presence of dropouts, our
approach provides orders-of-magnitude improvement in performance over previous
work.

4.1.1

Contributions

In summary, we make the following contributions:
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1. We propose a novel scalable secure aggregation protocol, based on layered secret
sharing, with improved concrete computation and communications cost compared
to previous work (including an orders-of-magnitude improvement in the presences
of dropouts).
2. We prove malicious security of SHARD in the real-ideal model with modifications
both to reflect dropout resistance and to support messaging efficiency in large
network settings.
3. We implement our approach and conduct an experimental evaluation demonstrating its concrete efficiency.

4.2
4.2.1

Background and Related Work
Secure Aggregation

Secure aggregation protocols are secure multiparty computation (MPC) [20] protocols
that allow a set of clients to work with a central server to aggregate their secret inputs,
revealing only the final aggregated result. Secure aggregation protocols have been
developed that are robust against both a corrupt central server and some fraction of
corrupt clients, in both the semi-honest and malicious settings.
The first scalable (1000 parties or more) secure aggregation protocol is due to
Bonawitz et al. [1]. In the Bonawitz protocol, each party generates a mask to obscure
their input, and submits the masked input to the server. The clients then perform
pairwise aggregation of their masks, and send the final aggregated masks to the server.
Finally, the server uses the aggregated masks to reveal the sum of the inputs. The
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primary communication cost in this protocol comes from the pairwise aggregation of
masks, which is linear in the number of participating clients.
Bell et al. [2] improve the communication cost of the Bonawitz approach by layering an additional protocol on top of it. The Bell protocol prunes the communication
graph of the Bonawitz protocol such that each of the n clients communicates with
log n other clients, and runs the Bonawitz protocol using this graph—reducing communication cost to be logarithmic in the number of clients. A complete comparison
of asymptotic costs appears in Table 4.1, for both existing protocols and our new
approach.
Our Contribution. Our novel protocol improves on previous work in three primary ways: (1) we achieve similar asymptotic complexity to Bell et al. [2] for the
client, and improved complexity for the server; (2) our approach has significantly
better concrete communications and computation compared to previous work; (2)
our approach is orders-of-magnitude faster than previous work at handling dropouts
during aggregation.

4.2.2

Secret Sharing

Our approach makes extensive use of threshold secret sharing. A (t, n)-secret sharing
scheme splits a secret into n shares such that at least t shares are required to reconstruct the secret. Our approach requires a threshold secret sharing scheme with the
following properties:
• share(t, n, s): breaks secret s into n secret shares that can reconstruct s with any
subset of at least t shares.
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• reconstruct: accepts a set of secret shares [s] as input and attempts to reconstruct
secret s.
• ∀a, b : [a] + [b] = [a + b] (additive homomorphism).
We use Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [11], which satisfies the above requirements.
Our implementation uses packed Shamir secret sharing [9], also known as batched
secret sharing [83], which speeds up sharing more than one value at a time.
As we will prove in Section 4.3.4, the security of SHARD is based on the security
guarantee of our secret sharing scheme. If the secret sharing scheme is secure in
the malicious setting, so is SHARD. We use a reconstruction scheme similar to
Benaloh’s [59] to ensure security in the malicious model.

4.2.3

Hypergeometric distribution

The hypergeometric distribution models the process of sampling objects from a population without replacement. HyperGeom(t, n, m, k) is the probability of drawing t
successes out of k draws from a population of size n which contains m successes. We
use the hypergeometric distribution to model the probability that a subset of our
federation will or will not be secure and correct.

4.2.4

Applications of Secure Aggregation

The target application for the secure aggregation protocol of Bonawitz et al. [1] was
federated learning [45], a distributed approach to machine learning. Secure aggregation is particularly useful as a component in systems for privacy-preserving deep
learning, in which clients use their sensitive data to locally compute updates for a
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centralized model. A single client’s update may reveal that client’s sensitive data,
but secure aggregation protocols can be used to aggregate the updates for learning
without revealing any single client’s information. In this context, secure aggregation protocols operate on gradients or model updates represented by large vectors
(containing hundreds of thousands to hundreds of millions of elements).
To prevent even the information leakage of aggregated updates, secure aggregation has been combined with differential privacy [6] to enable differentially private
federated learning [39, 46]. Differential privacy requires the addition of random noise
to ensure privacy; when the central server is trusted, then the server can be responsible for adding the noise. In our setting of a potentially untrusted server, each of the
clients can add enough noise that the aggregated results satisfy differential privacy
(as described by Kairouz et al. [46]). The combination of scalable secure aggregation
protocols with differential privacy allows for a stronger privacy guarantee than either
technique by itself.
Outside of federated learning, the values being aggregated are typically smaller.
Differentially private analytics systems like Honeycrisp [65], Orchard [66], and Crypt [68]
use specialized protocols for lower-dimensional data in order to scale to millions of
participants, and generally require some trust in the server. Our SHARD protocol has
the potential to replace these specialized approaches and provide a stronger threat
model, due to its ability to scale to hundreds of millions of clients.

4.2.5

MPC for Machine Learning

A plethora of MPC protocols have been proposed to accomplish efficient federated
learning. Many of these protocols are designed in a different threat model than
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Figure 4.1: Overview of SHARD. Each client splits their input into shards, then aggregates
each shard in a small group and reveals the result to the server. The server can reconstruct
the total sum, but not the sum of any small group’s inputs.

SHARD. Several take advantage of a semi-honest server [39], or use two non-colluding
servers [84–86]. Secure aggregation protocols [1,2] also leverage MPC techniques, and
can be applied to federated learning. Applications of MPC for federated learning tend
to use smaller federations than what is described in this work [87–89].

4.2.6

Generic MPC

MPC protocols can implement any function through arithmetic or boolean circuits [21–
25]. These generic MPC protocols work well in the two-party setting, in semi-honest
and malicious settings, and tend to be optimized for circuit depth. While some of
these protocols can extend to handling hundreds of users, they require a fully connected communication graph and do not scale to the large federations studied in this
work.
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4.3

Protocol definition

This section describes SHARD, our novel secure aggregation protocol to emulate
Functionality 9. The ideal functionality sums together the vectors that the trusted
third party receives from each client. The output is one vector the same shape as any
of the vectors received from any client.

4.3.1

Overview

We implement SHARD by applying the intuition of sharding to a secret sharing context. Sharding, when used in distributed databases or blockchains, refers to breaking
information into pieces (called shards) and distributing them among a federation for
the sake of security or performance.
In our protocol, we utilize Shamir sharing to break a parties’ secret input into
shards. Those shards are then further fragmented by another round of secret sharing.
A visual overview of SHARD appears in Figure 4.1. The intuition is to secret
share each share, and aggregate the secondary shares in small (O(log n)-sized) groups.
By doing so, we allow parties to aggregate their secrets among small subsets of the
federation. Their secrets are protected by the redundancy of the multi-level Shamir
sharing approach. If a small group happens to be controlled by the adversary, the
adversary has the ability to learn a share of the secret of each honest party in that
small group. Given the definition security properties of secret sharing, an individual
shard is useless on it’s own, and the adversary needs to control several specific groups
in order to find enough shards to reconstruct an honest party’s secret.
By choosing the number of members in each small group as well as the number of
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shards into which each secret is broken, we are able to effectively bound the probability
of an adversary attacking this protocol in the semi-honest and malicious settings.
Protocol Overview. Protocols 1, 2, and 3 describe our aggregation method in
detail. The three sub-protocols function together as follows: Protocol 1 describes a
simple Shamir sharing based aggregation protocol. Each member of a group sends
a share of their secrets to every other member of that group. The parties add their
shares and reconstruct the sum of their secrets. This is a well documented extant
protocol that we use as a subroutine for sharding.
Protocol 2 refers to the process of secure aggregation with subsets of the federation.
Where parties Protocol 1 send secret shares to every other party in their federation,
the federation in Protocol 2 is broken up into a number of smaller groups and each
group performs and instance of Protocol 1. The returned sums from all instances are
then added together to calculate the sum of all secret inputs.
This protocol can aggregate among large federations without revealing private
inputs provided that the group size and threshold are selected properly. Our formula
for calculating both of those parameters is included in Section 4.5.

4.3.2

Threat Model

We adopt the threat model of Bell et al. [2], since it is well-suited to the setting
of large federations. Our setting involves two classes of parties: (1) a single server,
and (2) n clients. We assume that the adversary may control both the server and
a fraction (γ) of the clients. γ =

1
2

corresponds to assuming an honest majority of

clients; for very large federations, it may be reasonable to assume a smaller γ. Our
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use of γ is similar to a (t, n)-Shamir sharing scheme’s security against a t/n-sized
proportion of clients. Our guarantees have several other parameters, described below
(and summarized in Section 4.5, Table 4.3).
Semi-honest security (confidentiality). In the semi-honest setting, we assume
that the server and all clients execute the protocol correctly, but that the adversarycontrolled parties (including the server) will attempt to learn the inputs of individual
honest clients by observing the protocol’s execution. SHARD guarantees that with
probability 1 − 2−σ − 2−η , an adversary who controls fewer than γn clients does not
learn the input of any honest client.
Malicious security (confidentiality). In the malicious setting, we assume that
adversary-controlled parties (including the server) may deviate arbitrarily from the
protocol. In the malicious setting, SHARD guarantees that with probability 1−2−σ −
2−η , an adversary who controls fewer than γn clients does not learn the input of any
honest client (i.e. the same confidentiality guarantee as in the semi-honest setting).
We prove malicious security in Section 4.3.4.
Dropouts, correctness, and availability. SHARD separately guarantees availability of the output against δf clients dropping out. This guarantee is more important among very large federations because the probability of some dropouts increases
as the federation size increases. SHARD cannot guarantee correctness or availability
of the output when the server is malicious. In the event that a malicious server forces
parties to dropout, we cannot guarantee availability or correctness, but can guarantee
confidentiality of honest inputs. Like Bonawitz et al. [1], and Bell et al. [2] we make
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the assumption that clients are authentic and not simulated for the sake of a Sybil
attack. We assume the list of clients is public prior to commencing the protocol,
and the existence of secure channels among the parties. As described in previous
work [1, 2], this problem can be solved using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) or by
assuming the server behaves honestly in the initialization round.
Failure probability. Traditional MPC security guarantees ensure that there is no
chance of an adversary breaking the confidentiality or integrity of a protocol, provided
that that adversary is not too strong. In the context of secret sharing, these guarantees inherently limit communication efficiency. For a (t, n)- secret sharing scheme,
guaranteeing that no adversary smaller than t can compromise security requires that
each party communicates with at least t other parties.
In order to improve communication efficiency, Bell et al. [2] and SHARD specify
our security guarantees with small probabilities of failure, which are parameterized
by σ and η. 2−σ is the probability that the security guarantee is not realized, and
2−η is the probability that the availability guarantee is not realized.
We set σ and η identically to Bell et al. [2] and choose σ = 40 and η ≥ 20.
This relaxation allows SHARD to significantly reduce communication complexity in
exchange for a one-in-a-trillion chance that an adversary can expose private inputs.
Realism of the threat model. In real-world deployments (e.g. federated learning or statistical analysis), the server operator generally has a strong incentive to
produce correct outputs—obtaining this output is typically the purpose of deploying
the system in the first place. Clients, on the other hand, typically care primarily
about confidentiality—the final output is being computed for the benefit of the server
72

operator, and its correctness does not benefit the client directly.
Like previous secure aggregation protocols [1, 2], our threat model is designed to
align with these incentives. Our primary goal is providing confidentiality for clients;
SHARD does not ensure correctness or availability of the final output when the server
is malicious, but the server operator has no incentive to corrupt their own final result.
Comparison of the threat model with related work. Compared to the closest
related work—the protocol of Bell et al. [2]—our threat model is slightly stronger.
Our threat model matches that of Bonawitz et al. [1] exactly. Bell et al. [2] uses
α ∈ (0, 1] to describe the amount of information leaked by a given secure aggregation
protocol. For a n party federation, α implies that any party’s information will be
securely aggregated with at least αn participants. In the protocol of Bell et al.,
reducing α can improve performance.
The ideal functionality has α = 1 − δ − γ. This implies that all honest parties
will have their values aggregated together. This is the best we can hope for because
parties who drop out might not have input, and malicious parties can subtract their
inputs from the ideal functionality’s output to obtain the sum of just the honest
party’s inputs.
SHARD always ensures the optimal value of α. The earlier protocol of Bonawitz
et al. [1] also ensures the optimal value of α, via communication between all pairs of
parties.
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Functionality 9: Ideal Functionality
Input : A set of private vector inputs s0 . . . sn .
Output: The sum of all values s0 . . . sg , which we denote as s.
Round 1: Each party j:
1. send sj to the trusted third party
Round 2: Trusted third party
s←

n
X

si

i=1

.

Protocol 1: group_agg
Input : a group of g participants, an input for each participant si , a
threshold t
Output: The sum of all values s0 . . . sg
Round 1: Each party j:
1. sh0j . . . shnj ← share(t, g, sj )
2. sends shij to party i∀i ∈ [0, g].
Round 2: Each party j:
1. receives shj0 . . . shjg
2. sumj ← Σshj0 . . . shjg .
3. broadcasts sumj .
Round 3: Each party j:
1. receives sum0 . . . sumg .
2. sum ← reconstruct(sum0 . . . sumg ).
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Protocol 2: sub_agg
Input : a partition P of n participants, a group size g, a threshold t < g,
each participant supplies their secret input si
Output: The sum of all values s0 . . . sn which we call S
Round 1: Each party j:
1. partitions P into groups of size g. Groups are partitioned deterministically
such that each party creates the same set of groups. Party j is a member of
one group: Gj . See section 4.4 for more information.
2. sumj ←group_agg(Gj , sj )
3. sends sumj to the server.
Round 2: The server:
1. receives sum0 . . . sumn
2. verifies that sumi = sumh if parties i, h are in the same group. If this is not
true for all groups, ABORT .
3. S ← Σni=0 sumi /g
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Protocol 3: SHARD
Input : Set of n participants P where each participant i has a value vi , a
group size g and a number of shards m (almost always 2). A
threshold t < g.
Output: The sum of all values v0 . . . vn which we denote V .
Round 1: Each party j:
1. shards shj0 . . . shjm ← share(m, m, vj )
Round 2: All parties
for i ∈ {0 . . . m} do
1. parties agree on P erm, a permutation
of the participant list.
2. sumi ←

sub_agg(P erm, g, t, sh0i . . . shni )

Round 2: The Server:
1. V ← reconstruct(sum0 . . . summ ).
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4.3.3

Example Protocol Trace

The following small example illustrates SHARD in action and higlights its features.
Suppose we have parties A, B, C, D with secrets in F2 . First, each party breaks their
secret into shards as shown in the table below. For the sake of this example, parties
use additive secret sharing for shard generation.
Party

Secret

Shards

A

1

1, 0

B

1

0, 1

C

0

0, 0

D

0

1, 1

The parties will now perform the sub_agg protocol on their two shards. This includes
a partitioning of parties into subsets.
Round

subset 1

subset 2

1

{A, B}

{C, D}

2

{D, B}

{C, A}

We note that for groups of size 2, it is trivial for an adversarial party to determine
their group mate’s shard in both rounds. That said, the mechanism of sharding,
together with partitioning, prevents the adversary from learning the other shard,
thus maintaining the privacy of inputs. In this example, if B is an adversary, it
can learn A’s first shard and D’s second shard. However, it cannot determine A or
D’s other shards either directly- due to choice of partitions- or indirectly- because
it knows nothing about C’s shards. This outlines the importance of proper group
selection to ensure protocol security. If we used the same groups for rounds 1 and 2,
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then B would learn A’s secret, etc. Of course, if two parties B and C are corrupt,
then they may collude to obtain the secrets of A and D, but we assume an honest
majority.
Once the parties are broken into groups, they perform group_agg and aggregate
their to find the sums of each sharding round. For the sake of brevity we consider
group_agg a black box that returns the sum of shards.

Protocol

Result

group_agg({A, B})
group_agg({C, D})

1

sub_agg(Round 1)

0

group_agg({D, B})
group_agg({A, C})

0

sub_agg(Round 2)

0

1

0

In all cases group_agg returns the sum of the shards applied as input. In round 1,
we have 1 + 0 = 1 and 0 + 1 = 1 for the shards of A, B, C, and D respectively. These
group-level sums are aggregated per the sub_agg protocol to obtain the sum of 0.
An identical process is applied to the round 2 shards to calculate their sum, which is
also 0.
The final step of SHARD is to reconstruct the output V from the sharding round
sums. Because we are using additive secret sharing in this example, this process is
simply:
V = sub_agg(Round1) + sub_agg(Round2) = 0 + 0 = 0
This is correct- the sum of all inputs is 1 + 1 + 0 + 0 = 0 in F2 .
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4.3.4

Protocol Privacy

Threat models
We consider a semi-honest, and a malicious secure threat model parameterized by γ
and δ as described in section 4.3.2. With respect to protocol execution, the semihonest and malicious models are differentiated by the security of the secret sharing
scheme. If SHARD is implemented with semi-honest secure secret sharing, then
SHARD is secure in the semi-honest model. If SHARD is implemented with malicious
secure secret sharing, then SHARD is secure in the malicious model.
Because the semi-honest threat model is a specific case of the malicious threat
model, we prove security in the malicious model. In the malicious model, we expect
arbitrary deviations from the protocol from both malicious clients and the server.
Furthermore, we expect the server and malicious clients to collaborate.
We do, however, assume that the server is not simulating parties as part of a Sybil
attack. Preventing this behavior can be solved with public key infrastructure, and we
consider protection against this type of attack out of scope for SHARD. This is the
only restriction we apply to server behavior for the sake of input confidentiality. It
is also worth noting SHARD ensures correctness and availability against a δ fraction
of clients dropping out, but does not guarantee correctness or availability against a
dropped out server.
Malicious Security
Suppose the ideal functionality of addition as F , an adversary A. Let vi and xi be
input and view of client i respectively. Let V be the output of π.
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Let U be the set of clients. Let C ⊂ U ∪ {S} be the set of corrupt parties, and
D ⊂ U be the set of dropped out parties. The set of honest parties is H = U \(C ∪D).
In this proof, we consider the dropped out parties as a part of the adversary
without loss of generality.
Theorem 3. There exists a PPT simulator SIM such that for all U , |C| ≤ γ|U |, and
|D| ≤ δ|U |

REALπ,A (n; xH ) ≡ IDEALF,SIM (n, xH )

The intuition behind this statement is that no such adversary can exist on our
protocol that is more powerful than an adversary against the ideal functionality.
Proof. Proven through the hybrid argument. We assume that any honest party will
ABORT if they receive an ill-formed message, an untimely message, or an abort
from any other party. Furthermore, we assume secure channels between each pair of
parties.
1. This hybrid is a random variable distributed exactly like REALπ,A (n; xH ).
2. In this hybrid SIM has access to all {xi |i ∈ U }. SIM runs the full protocol and
outputs a view of the adversary from the previous hybrid.
3. In this hybrid, SIM generates the ideal inputs of the corrupt and dropout parties
using a separate simulator SIMg . These sets of inputs, xC and xD , contain a
field element or ⊥ for each corrupt or dropout party respectively. Through this
process, SIMg may force the output of F to be any field element or ⊥. Thus
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SIMg is able to produce the same protocol outputs that A is able to in REAL, so

this hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous hybrid.
4. In this hybrid, SIM replaces V , the output of the protocol, with the known
output of the ideal function and the aggregation of all the ideal inputs of the
corrupt parties. We exclude the inputs of the dropped out parties. This hybrid
is indistinguishable from the previous hybrid with probability 2−η as defined in
Section 4.5, provided that group assignments satisfy property 2
5. In this hybrid SIM replaces the shards of each honest parties with a secret
sharing of a random field elements such that the field elements sum to the
output of IDEAL. This hybrid is indistinguishable from the previous hybrid
with probability 2−σ as defined in Section 4.5. This is because the adversary
should not have access to enough shares to reconstruct any individual party’s
secret.

4.3.5

Complexity Analysis

Suppose n clients with k values to send.
Client Computation
O(k log2 n). The client needs to break k values into logn values. For a Shamir sharing
of m shares takes O(m2 ). The addition and reconstruction take O(logn) and O(klog n )
time respectively.
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Client Communication
O(k log n). The client needs to send O(log n) clients O(k) values each.
Server Computation
O(nk). The server needs to add all of the group sums together and reconstruct the
shard-level Shamir shares. This includes processing the output of all parties. The
shard-level Shamir share is treated as a constant cost because there are always two
shard shares.
Server Communication
O(nk). The server receives output from all parties.

4.4

Group Assignments

Beyond assigning groups such that they are unlikely to be corrupted and that they are
unlikely to dropout, we also would like to assign groups over the two rounds such that
the outputs of multiple groups cannot be combined to leak additional information. In
particular, Protocol 2 exposes the sums of each subgroup. Protocol 3 can also release
sums of small sets of parties if groups are not chosen carefully.
For simplicity we set m = 2, which is also consistent with our evaluation. However,
we conjecture that the results in this section are easily generalized to m > 1.
Information Leakage from Overlapping Groups. Let R1 and R2 be the sets
of groups used in the two respective invocations of sub_agg within the for loop of
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Round 2 for protocol 3. Each party is a member of a group in R1 and a member of a
group in R2 . They aggregate their first shard with the group in R1 and their second
shard with the group in R2 .
Consider the case where a single group G is used in both rounds: G ∈ R1 ∧G ∈ R2 .
An adversary can reconstruct the sum of inputs of parties in G by using reconstruct
on the outputs of G in rounds 1 and 2.
Requiring R1 ∩ R2 = {} is not sufficient to prevent such an attack. Suppose
there exist some groups G1 , G2 , G3 , G4 such that G1 , G2 ∈ R1 , G3 , G4 ∈ R2 and
G1 ∪ G2 = G3 ∪ G4 . An adversary can reconstruct the sum of parties in groups
G1 ∪ G2 by calling reconstruct on the sum of G1 and G2 ’s round 1 outputs and the
sum of G3 and G4 ’s round 2 outputs.
Graph background. A graph G = (V, E) where V is the set of nodes and E is the
set of edges such that (i, j) ∈ E ⇐⇒ i ∈ V ∧ j ∈ V ∧ there is an edge between i
and j. These are undirected graphs so (i, j) and (j, i) are equivalent. We consider a
subgraph SG = (V 0 , E 0 ) where V 0 ⊆ V and E 0 ⊆ E ∧ (i, j) ∈ E 0 ⇒ (i ∈ V 0 ∧ j ∈ V 0 ).
Finally we consider a disconnected subgraph DG = (V 00 , E 00 ) of G if CC is a
subgraph of G, and ∀(i, j) ∈ E, i ∈ V 00 ⇒ (i, j) ∈ E 00 . In other words, all nodes
in a disconnected subgraph of G exclusively have edges to other nodes within the
disconnected subgraph. The disconnected subgraph is disconnected from the rest of
G.
Avoiding Information Leakage. In order to ensure that no subset sum can be
accessed besides the sum of all honest parties, we require that our honest party
communication graph is fully connected. We define a party communication graph as
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HG = (V, E) s.t.
V = {honest parties}
E = {(i, j)| ∃ G ∈ R1 ∪ R2 |i ∈ G ∧ j ∈ G}
The honest party communication graph draws connections between any two parties that are in a group together in either round.
Property 1. Suppose a subgraph SG = (V 0 , E 0 ) of HG. sum(0 V ) is recoverable ⇒
SG is a disconnected subgraph
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose a subgraph SG = (V 0 , E 0 ) where the
sum of V 0 is accessible, but SG is not a disconnected subgraph.
Because SG is not a disconnected subgraph, we know
∃i, j ∈ V |i ∈ V 0 ∧ j ∈
/ V 0 ∧ (i, j) ∈ E
Ultimately, there is an edge between a node in SG and a node outside of SG.
From the existence of this edge we know that i and j were in a group together for
one of the sharding rounds. This implies that one of i’s shards is aggregated with
one of j’s shards, and a sum including either of these shards would have to include
the other. We reach contradiction here because j is not in SG, so the sum of SG is
unavailable.

From Property 1, the requirement that HG remain fully connected emerges.
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Parties
(Bonawitz)

Parties
(FLDP)

Dropouts

Server
(FLDP)

Client
(FLDP)

Server
(Bonawitz)

Client
(Bonawitz)

500
1000

100,000
1,000,000

0
0

101 ms
898 ms

5424 ms
5878 ms

2018 ms
4887 ms

849 ms
1699 ms

500
1000

100,000
1,000,000

166
333

101 ms
898 ms

5424 ms
5878 ms

143,389 ms
413,767 ms

849 ms
1699 ms

Table 4.2: Comparison to results from Bonawitz et al. [1] for 500 and 1000 parties with 0
and 30% dropout are included for comparison. In order to create these results, we consider
our k = 100

Property 2. HG.isconnected ⇒ no subset sum leakage.
This property follows directly from Property 1. Because there are no connected
components of a fully connected graph, no sums smaller than the one released by the
ideal functionality are revealed.
Generating Groups. There are conceivably many different ways to generate groups
for two rounds of sharding to ensure HG remains fully connected, and different instantiations of this protocol might want to use different group generation methods to
adapt to network conditions like geo-location. In our implementation we determine
group membership based on a single permutation of the network. Suppose i is the
index of some party in our permutation, and g is the group size. Party i is a member
of group i//g for the first round, and (i//g + g ∗ i%g) n for the second round. The
expression for second round moves the j th member of each group j groups forward.
This spreads parties around for the second round sufficiently enough to ensure that
HG is fully connected.
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Figure 4.2: Number of neighbors required for Protocol 3 with different federation sizes and
assumptions about the adversary. Left: Semi-honest protocol with less-dropout tolerable
configurations (η = −20, δ >= .05). Center: Semi-honest protocol with more conservative
parameter settings. In this case η = −30, and the highest tested γ is .5. Right: Malicious
protocol configurations.

4.5

Setting Parameters

Our security proofs for SHARD assume that group size, and the reconstruction threshold are selected appropriately to guarantee security. This section reasons about the
appropriate parameters given specifications about the aggregating environment. All
parameters involved in determining security are listed in Table 4.3.
Above the double line are the parameters comprising our configuration. The
protocol administrator will selected these parameters to suit their needs. Below the
double line are the g, t and k, the parameters we feed directly to the protocol.
Number of Shards Notably, we exclude m, the number of shards, from Table 4.3,
because we find that m = 2 is optimal for reducing the total number of shares that
each party must generate. The condition m > 1 is essential to ensuring that SHARD
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Expansion Factor

2.8

478 clients
625 clients
1000 clients
Bonawitz: 500 parties
Bonawitz: 1000 parties

2.6
2.4
2.2
2.0
1.8
1.6
0.2

0.4

0.6
Vector Size

0.8

1.0
1e6

Figure 4.3: Expansion Factor of protocol defined by [2] and FLDP with different numbers of
neighbors. FLDP results for larger number of neighbors are reported because FLDP typically
requires about twice the number of neighbors as Bell.

does not leak sums over strict subsets of the honest parties, but we find no additional
security benefit for m > 2. For each shard, a party must interact with one group.
While larger values of m reduce the group size required for specific values of σ and
η, the additional groups required by increasing m ultimately increase the number of
shares that a party must generate. Therefore, we set m = 2 as a constant for all
configurations.
We would like to set g and t to ensure that two events do not happen.
1. A group is corrupted (more adversaries than t).
2. A group cannot reconstruct its sum (more dropouts than g − t − k).
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Figure 4.4: Expansion Factor of Protocol 3 with different federation sizes and assumptions
about the adversary. Packed secret sharing is used with k = 100. Left: Semi-honest protocol with less-dropout tolerable configurations (η = −20, δ >= .05). Center: Semi-honest
protocol with more conservative parameter settings. In this case η = −30, and the highest
tested γ is .5. Right: Malicious protocol configurations.
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Figure 4.5: Server time for Protocol 3 with different federation sizes and assumptions about
the adversary. K = 100. Left: Semi-honest protocol with less-dropout tolerable configurations (η = −20, δ >= .05). Center: Semi-honest protocol with more conservative parameter
settings. In this case η = −30, and the highest tested γ is .5. Right: Malicious protocol
configurations.

We can guarantee with absolute certainty that these two events do not happen if
we trivially set g = f and t > f γ and g − t − k > f δ. However that clearly leads
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Figure 4.6: Per client time for Protocol 3 with different federation sizes and assumptions
about the adversary.K = 100. Left: Semi-honest protocol with less-dropout tolerable configurations (η = −20, δ >= .05). Center: Semi-honest protocol with more conservative
parameter settings. In this case η = −30, and the highest tested γ is .5. Right: Malicious
protocol configurations.

to poor protocol performance. Instead, we use the same convention as Bell et al. [2]
and select g, t, and k to keep the probability of events (1) and (2) very low. This is
reflected in our parameters in the way of σ and η. They are defined as P [(1)] < 2−σ
and P [(2)] < 2−η .
To determine how likely these events are over the entire federation, we first start
by determining their probability at the group level. Suppose we have a group of size
g, and a federation of size n. The probability of an individual belonging to a group
with i corrupt clients is hypergeometric.
HyperGeom(i, n − 1, γn, g)
We are sampling clients to be corrupt without replacement from a population of size
n−1 with γn clients in it because we assume that one client in each group is honest. In
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Parameter
σ
η
γ
δ
f
g
t
k

Description
1 − 2−σ is the probability of
secure protocol execution
1 − 2−η is the probability of
correct protocol execution.
corrupt fraction of federation
fraction of federation that
will drop out
Number of clients in the federation.
the number of clients in
each group.
the reconstruction threshold in each group.
the number of values to be
shared at once.

Table 4.3: independent and dependent variables to ensure protocol security

the incredibly unlikely event that a group is entirely comprised of corrupt clients, it is
inconsequential to the security of the protocol because no honest client can have their
inputs exposed by this event. Furthermore, they could change the final output of the
protocol, but an attack of this variety is no more powerful modifying the adversarial
client’s inputs to the protocol.
We can use the CDF of the hypergeometric distribution to calculate the probability
that one group is not corrupted.
pn c = HyperGeomCDF (t − 1, n − 1, γn, g)
Similarly, the probability of a group reconstructing in spite of dropouts is a CDF of
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a hypergeometric distribution:
pn d = 1 − HyperGeomCDF (g − t − k, n − 1, δn, g)
Packed secret sharing requires t+k−1 shares to reconstruct a secret. To use malicious
reconstruction, we require t + k shares, so we require that fewer than g − t − k clients
in that group dropout.
Finally we need to consider the security and reliability of all groups. We do so by
calculating the probability that all groups are secure and reconstruct properly, then
use the complement of these values.
pcorrupt = 1 − pn c2n/g
pdropout = 1 − pn d2n/g
The exponent 2n/g is the total number of groups over both sharding rounds. Finally we take the negative log of our probabilities to compare them to the security
parameters σ and η.
σ ≤ − log2 (pcorrupt )
η ≤ − log2 (pdropout )
These formulas, allow aggregators to specify specific security and correctness parameters (σ, η), and assume the probability of corrupt or dropped out individuals (γ, δ),
and calculate g, t, k. We implement a search algorithm to determine the minimum
number of neighbors each client requires for a given set of security parameters.
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4.6

Evaluation

This section evaluates the concrete performance of SHARD with respect to communication and computation. Through a series of experiments, we will answer the
following research questions:
RQ1 How does SHARD scale to large federations?
RQ2 How does SHARD handle vector length?
RQ3 In practice, what are the computational demands of SHARD?
Implementation. For our experiments, we implemented a simulation of SHARD
in Python, using numpy to perform field arithmetic. We implemented packed Shamir
secret sharing based on [61]. The code used in our experiments is available as open
source on GitHub.1
Comparison to Previous Work. Our comparisons to the protocols of Bonawitz
et al. [1] and Bell et al. [2] are based on concrete results given in their papers, or
calculated based on analytical bounds they give (e.g. for expansion factor and number
of required neighbors).

4.6.1

Communication Performance

To answer RQ1, we calculate the communication cost per client for various federation
configurations and assumptions. These configurations align closely with those tested
1

Redacted for review
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by [2] in order to provide a clear comparison between our approaches. Federation
range from 1000 to 100, 000, 000 parties in these experiments.
Figures 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 reference semi-honest and malicious threat models.
We note that the threat model of SHARD is dictated by the security of the secret sharing primitive. The primary difference between our semi-honest and malicious secure
secret sharing primitives is the malicious secure primitive uses a slower reconstruction
technique, and requires one more share per reconstruction.
Each configuration is determined by the parameters described in Table 4.3: σ,
η, δ, γ, k, and the federation size. We used a modified binary search to determine
the group size and threshold that would appropriately satisfy the constraints formed
by the fixed parameters applied to the probability formulas defined in Section 4.5.
Because each party participates in two groups, one for each shard, the total number
of neighbors is simply twice the group size.
Figure 4.2 displays these results for Protocol 3. We see the expected O(log n)
trend with respect to the number of neighbors required. Both protocols require a
comparable number of neighbors to Bell et al. [2], and substantially fewer shares than
the naïve approach. Notably, using the malicious protocol has very little effect on the
communication complexity.
To answer RQ2, we evaluate the expansion factor of Protocol 3 using packed
secret sharing for group level aggregations. A scalable protocol with respect to vector
size will have small expansion factors. Expansion factor measures the amount of
communication required for a protocol as a multiple of the required communication
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for the ideal functionality. In our case Expansion factor is:
!

EX =

num_neighbors
· log(f ield_size)
k

Figure 4.4 contains the results. The results show that expansion factor depends on
the level of robustness against dropouts and malicious clients, but is consistent across
federation sizes.
Comparison with Bell et al. [2]. Figure 4.3 compares the expansion factor of
SHARD against the protocol of Bell et al. [2]. The amortized number of shares
required to represent each value is relatively small considering that we secret share
the entire vector. Packing is especially useful in cases where the expected number of
dropouts is low. We calculate the expansion factor for Bell et. al.’s protocol based
on the formula in [1], but replacing the federation size with number of neighbors
to reflect the optimized communication graph. With small vectors, our protocol
provides a substantially smaller expansion factor. Our protocol’s expansion factor
remains constant or monotonically decreases as vector size increases. For very large
vectors (100k+ elements), prior work [1, 2] provides a smaller expansion factor.

4.6.2

Computation Performance

In this section we hope to answer RQ3 by simulating SHARD on large federations
and reporting client and server computation performance. We implement our protocol in python and run simulations in a single thread on an AWS z1d.2xlarge instance
with 64 Gb of memory [62]. Our timing experiments are designed to compare our
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concrete computation performance with that of prior work. Following the experimental designs of Bonawitz et al. [1], we ignore communication latency and throughput
in our experiments.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 respectively plot the server and client computation times for
Protocol 3. Even for a federation of 100, 000, 000 parties, aggregating 100 values
per client requires less than a second of server computation and less than a 10th
second of computation per client for all corruption and dropout assumptions we examined. Provided that dropouts do not increase beyond the assumption made when
configuring parameters, the protocol will achieve the correct result with no additional
computational cost.
In order to demonstrate the impact of working with dropouts without additional
computation, we partially simulate the use of our protocol to aggregate large vectors
and compare with the concrete results presented in Bonawitz et. al. [1]. To aggregate
a vector with 100, 000 elements, we simply repeat the protocol with k = 100 for 1000
iterations. We simulate a subset of groups and use dummy values for the remainder
of the group inputs to server to reduce the total simulation time, and to reduce the
effect of memory pressure on client level simulations.
Comparison with Bell et al. [2]. The work of Bell et. al. [2] improves on the
number of neighbors required of each client substantially, we run our protocol on
substantially larger federations than the ones considered in [1] to create a more fair
comparison to Bell et. al. Our results are included in Table 4.2.
While we see that the sharding approach does not perform as well in the case
with no dropouts, adding a few dropouts drastically harms the server computation
time of the masking based approach. These amounts of dropouts are substantial in
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the smaller federations used in [1], but both prospective numbers of dropouts are far
more realistic considering the much larger federations we consider here as they are
well less than 1%. For this comparison, our approach tolerates 5% dropouts, so we
could potentially further increase the number of dropouts at no cost to the sharding
approach.

4.7

Conclusion

We propose a new highly scalable secure aggregation protocol, SHARD, with much
better performance compared to prior work [2] in settings with small vectors or many
dropped out parties. SHARD scales gracefully to accommodate hundreds of millions
of parties while requiring only hundreds of connections per party in the vast majority
of settings. Defense against malicious adversaries requires little modification of the
protocol, and does not substantially affect communication or computation costs–we
simply require one additional share per group, and perform the reconstruction twice.
Our empirical results show that SHARD can aggregate over very large federations
with a small computational cost. Small vector secure aggregation protocols have
applications in distributed data analytics as well as smaller machine learning models.
Histograms, random forests, logistic regression, and small neural networks would all
benefit from protocols enabling short vector aggregation [90,91]. Thus our technology
has potentially broad applications. Our experiments suggest that 2 shards per party
is optimal for this protocol, however tighter approximations of the probability of a
security failure could suggest otherwise. Furthermore, more rounds of sharding open
the possibility of packed secret sharing within the sharding round, and a protocol
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that better supports wider vectors. Investigation of these threads are future work.

97

Chapter 5
Immediate Sensitivity

5.1

Introduction

Crowd-sourced data has enabled major advancements in machine learning capabilities. While novel deep learning techniques continue to solve new and exciting problems, they also represent a major privacy concern for the sensitive data used to train
them. There is growing evidence that these complex networks memorize substantial
amounts of their training data, and that membership inference attacks [4,5,44,49] are
capable of extracting this information from trained models.
Several different defenses against membership inference have emerged. Techniques
like regularization [44], dropout [92], hiding prediction information [44], and distillation [93,94] have been used to defend against membership inference attacks, with limited success. The strongest defense seems to be provided by differential privacy [6,49],
but the noise required for differentially private deep learning [7] results in less accurate models. As a result, differentially private models lag behind non-private models
in accuracy [95].
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In this paper we introduce immediate sensitivity, a defense against membership
inference attacks that is inspired by differential privacy but which produces more
accurate models. With immediate sensitivity, we tailor the noise added during training to the actual sensitivity of the gradient being computed. Compared to previous
work [7], our approach eliminates the need for gradient clipping and produces more
accurate models than the gradient clipping approach. Immediate sensitivity is an approximation of local sensitivity [96], which can be much lower than global sensitivity.
Importantly, immediate sensitivity can be efficiently computed during training using
the automatic differentiation procedures in existing deep learning frameworks like
PyTorch and TensorFlow. Our training procedure is similar to existing differentially
private approaches [7], but calibrates noise to immediate sensitivity instead of the
clipping parameter.
Our approach is intended specifically as a defense against membership inference
attacks. Even though it is inspired by differential privacy, our approach does not
provide a formal privacy guarantee (see Section 5.3 for details). We evaluate the
approach empirically, using two privacy attacks on machine learning models: the
membership inference attack of Yeom et al. [4] and the data poisoning attack of
Jagielski et al. [3]. We compare the accuracy of models trained using our approach
to the accuracy of models with similar privacy properties trained using the gradientclipping approach. For similar success rates of the privacy attacks, our approach
consistently produces more accurate models.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following contributions:
• Immediate sensitivity, an approximation of local sensitivity for gradient com99

putations in deep neural networks that is efficiently calculated with existing
automatic differentiation procedures.
• A novel training algorithm, inspired by gradient-perturbation approaches for
differential privacy, that leverages immediate sensitivity to calibrate noise as a
defense against membership inference attacks.
• Empirical results suggesting that our training algorithm provides higher accuracy for a given level of membership inference advantage than the standard
gradient-clipping approach for differentially private deep learning.

5.2

Background & Related Work

Deep learning. We consider supervised learning problems involving trainable weights
(or parameters) θ. Given an example x, the model makes a prediction θ(x) for the
example’s label ŷ. The training task is to fit θ to a set of training examples (xi , yi )
of size N in order to minimize the value of the loss function L(θ). In our setting,
the total loss is defined in terms of the loss on single example (xi , yi ): L(θ(xi ), yi ).
In minibatch stochastic gradient descent (SGD), we consider a batch of examples
(xb , yb ) and compute the gradient of the loss over the batch: ∇L(θ(xb ), yb ). Then,
we update the model θt+1 = θt − η∇L(θ(xb ), yb ) (where η is the learning rate).
Membership inference attacks. A membership inference attack infers whether
or not a sample was in the training dataset of a given model. Yeom et. al. [4] proposed
the attack we use in our evaluation, along with advantage as a metric to compare
the efficacy of membership inference attacks. Advantage is the difference between the
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true positive rate and the false positive rate for a series of tests. In our membership
inference experiments we calculate true positive rate on the whole training dataset
and false positive rate on the whole testing dataset.
Defenses against membership inference. Ad-hoc defenses against membership
inference attacks often involve forms of regularization that can improve generalization. These include L2 regularization [44], dropout [92], and distillation [93, 94]. The
intuition behind this approach is that regularization reduces the influence of any single training example on the trained model, which should defend against membership
inference. However, previous work has shown [44, 94] that defending against membership inference attacks in complex problems requires too much regularization to
maintain good accuracy in trained models.
Differential privacy. Differential privacy [6] is a formal framework for privacypreserving data analysis. A randomized mechanism M provides (, δ)-differential
privacy if for all neighboring datasets D and D0 (which differ in one person’s data)
and all possible sets of outcomes O:
Pr[M(D) ∈ O] ≤ e Pr[M(D0 ) ∈ O] + δ
Here,  and δ are called the privacy parameters or privacy budget, and control the
strength of the guarantee. Differential privacy is compositional: two (, δ)-differentially
private data releases compose to satisfy (2, 2δ)-differential privacy. Rényi differential
privacy (RDP) [19] is a relaxation of differential privacy that provides tighter bounds
on the privacy cost of composition. A mechanism M provides (α, )-RDP for α > 1 if
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Dα (M(D)kM(D0 )) ≤ , where Dα is the Rényi divergence of order α; running such
a mechanism k times satisfies (α, k)-RDP.
Sensitivity & noise calibration. Mechanisms achieve differential privacy by adding
random noise to sensitive query results. The scale of the noise is determined by the
privacy parameters and by the query’s sensitivity. For a distance metric d such that
d(D, D0 ) ≤ 1 defines neighboring datasets, the L2 global sensitivity of a function
f : D → Rd is defined as:
∆2 f =

D,D0 ∈D

max
s.t.

d(D,D0 )≤1

kf (D) − f (D0 )k2

The sensitivity of f reflects the potential influence of one person’s data on the function’s output. The higher the sensitivity, the more random noise is needed to mask
one person’s influence on the results. The Gaussian mechanism [6, 19] releases the
value f (D) + N (0, σ 2 I) where σ 2 =

(∆2 f )α
,
2

and satisfies (α, )-RDP. As the sensitivity

of the function f goes up, so does the noise needed for differential privacy.
Differentially private deep learning & gradient clipping. Abadi et. al. [7] developed the first effective differential privacy framework for deep learning, improving
significantly on the privacy analysis for SGD of previous approaches [8, 97–99]. Since
then, follow-up work has tightened the privacy analysis further [34, 57]. All of these
approaches work by gradient perturbation: they add Gaussian noise to computed gradients before updating the model, and calculate total privacy cost by composition.
These training algorithms bound the global sensitivity of each gradient computation
using gradient clipping: they compute per-example gradients, limit each one to have
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L2 norm bounded by a constant C, and then average the clipped per-example gradients. The global L2 sensitivity of the average for a batch of size b in this situation
is

C
.
b

Previous work has demonstrated the effectiveness of this approach in defeating

privacy attacks on deep learning models [4, 5, 44, 49].
The gradient-clipping approach is a simple method for bounding the sensitivity of
a complex function (the gradient computation), which may actually have unbounded
global sensitivity in general. This simplicity has contributed to its popularity.
However, the gradient-clipping approach has several drawbacks. First, it requires
computing per-example gradients, which can be computationally expensive [100]. Second, it may slow convergence by discarding useful gradient information. Third, it may
add more noise than necessary to achieve privacy, if the true sensitivity of the gradient is less than C. In fact, achieving good accuracy on complex problems using
the gradient-clipping approach remains a challenge [95], perhaps due to these latter
points. An alternative approach to differentially private deep learning based on noisy
aggregation of teacher models [101] can achieve higher accuracy, but at the cost of
significantly increased training time.
Local sensitivity & connection to the derivative. Local sensitivity [96] is an
alternative to clipping for functions with unbounded global sensitivity. Like global
sensitivity, local sensitivity bounds the influence of one person’s data on a function’s
output. However, local sensitivity fixes one of the function’s inputs to be the actual
data being processed, and takes the maximum over its neighbors. Local sensitivity
can be much lower than global sensitivity because it only considers neighbors of the

103

actual dataset, and may exclude worst-case pairs of datasets. Formally:
LS2 (f, D) =

D0 ∈D

max

s.t.

kf (D) − f (D0 )k2

d(D,D0 )≤1

Local sensitivity raises two important challenges: (1) since its value is based on the
data, local sensitivity is itself sensitive; (2) for many functions, local sensitivity is even
more difficult to calculate than global sensitivity. Frameworks like smooth sensitivity [96] address the first challenge by adding additional noise to mask the influence
of the data on the sensitivity. Addressing the second challenge for arbitrary functions remains an open question; with some exceptions (e.g. the sample & aggregate
framework [101]), this challenge has prevented the widespread use of local sensitivity
in systems for differential privacy.
Recently, Laud et al. [102] proposed derivative sensitivity, an approach for upperbounding local sensitivity using a function’s derivative. By the mean value theorem,
for datasets D and D0 , there exists a value D00 such that ∇f (D00 ) ≥ kf (D)−f (D0 )k2 —
which is exactly the quantity we need to bound for local sensitivity. If ∇f is βsmooth [96], then we can also upper bound ∇f (D00 ) based on the value of ∇f (D):
LS2 (f, D) ≤ eβ ∇f (D)
A function f is β-smooth if for neighboring x and y, f (x) ≤ eβ f (y) [96]. For complex
functions, determining an upper bound on β is also a major challenge. Laud et
al. apply the derivative sensitivity approach to database queries, where bounding
smoothness is tractable.
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5.3

Immediate Sensitivity

The primary contribution of our work is an efficiently computed approximation of
the local sensitivity of a gradient computation, which can be used to defend against
membership inference attacks without gradient clipping. In this section, we describe
how to apply the results of Laud et al. [102] to gradient computations in deep learning,
and show how to efficiently approximate local sensitivity using immediate sensitivity.
Intutition Immediate sensitivity seeks to accurately characterize how much a given
input has influence over a gradient update. If a small change to an input corresponds
to a large change in that input’s gradient, then we would like a large immediate
sensitivity value. We accomplish this result by taking the gradient of the gradient
with respect to the input. Assuming that the gradient space is smooth, taking a
gradient with respect to the input effectively simulates making small changes to the
input and quantifying its effect on the model update.
Local sensitivity of the gradient. Laud et al. [102] extend derivative sensitivity
to general Banach spaces. For vector-valued functions f : Rd1 → Rd2 and the L2
norm, we can bound local sensitivity as follows:
LS2 (f, D) ≤ exp(β) · k∇x kf (x)k2 k2

(5.1)

We would like to use this technique to bound the local sensitivity of the gradient
computation ∇L(θ(xb ), yb ), where L is the loss function, θ is a vector of model parameters, and xb and xb represent a batch of training examples. We use a distance
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def ImmediateSensitivity(gradient, inputs):
grad_l2 = torch.norm(gradient, p = 2)
sens_vec = torch.autograd.grad(grad_l2, inputs, ...)
is
= torch.norm(sens_vec, p=2).max()
return is

Figure 5.1: Pseudocode for computing immediate sensitivity in PyTorch.

metric d(xb , xb0 ) on batches that measures how many examples differ between xb and
xb0 where d(xb , xb0 ) ≤ 1:
LSgrad = k∇L(θ(xb ), yb ) − ∇L(θ(xb0 ), yb )k2
≤ exp(β) · k∇xb k∇θ L(θ(xb ), yb )k2 k2
= exp(β) · max k∇xi k∇θ L(θ(xb ), yb )k2 k2
xi ∈xb

(5.2)

Thus, given a value for β, we can compute an upper bound on the local sensitivity
of the gradient using a second-order gradient. Note that the two gradients here are
over different function inputs; we use subscripts to indicate this difference. Existing
deep learning frameworks are capable of efficiently computing the second term of this
result by taking the gradient multiple times.
Bounding smoothness. Unfortunately, determining an upper bound for β in the
context of complex network architectures is a challenging open problem. However, our
experience suggests that the second-order gradient in Equation (5.2) is fairly smooth
for typical neural network architectures. We make the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 (Constant-β Hypothesis). For well-behaved neural network architectures, exp(β) is nearly constant and reasonably small.
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Immediate sensitivity. If the constant-β hypothesis is true, then we can approximate local sensitivity to within a small constant factor using only the second term
of Equation (5.2). This idea is the intuition behind immediate sensitivity, which is
defined simply by dropping exp(β) from Equation (5.2):
Definition 3 (Immediate Sensitivity). For a batch of examples (xb , yb ), the L2 immediate sensitivity of the gradient computation ∇L(θ(xb ), yb ) is defined as follows,
where ∇xi denotes the gradient with respect to the features of example xi and ∇θ
denotes the gradient with respect to the model weights:
IS = max k∇xi k∇θ L(θ(xb ), yb )k2 k2
xi ∈xb

Immediate sensitivity can be efficiently computed using existing automatic differentiation frameworks, including the ones built into PyTorch and Tensorflow. Figure 5.1 contains pseudocode for computing immediate sensitivity in PyTorch. Its
arguments are (1) gradient, the gradient of the loss for a batch of training examples
(i.e. ∇θ L(θ(xb ), yb )) and (2) inputs, the batch itself (i.e. xb ).
Since immediate sensitivity is an approximation of local sensitivity (and not an
upper bound), it cannot be used to achieve a provable guarantee of differential privacy. However, if the constant-β hypothesis holds, then scaling noise to immediate
sensitivity should provide many of the benefits of differential privacy. We evaluate the
privacy provided by the use of immediate sensitivity (and indirectly, the constant-β
hypothesis) empirically in Section 5.5.
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5.4

Membership Inference Defense for
Deep Learning Using Immediate Sensitivty

The most popular existing approach to differentially private deep learning [7] uses
gradient clipping to bound global sensitivity. We present a similar training algorithm
(Algorithm 4), which calibrates noise to immediate sensitivity instead (lines 6-7).
Algorithm 4 has two major benefits over the existing gradient-clipping approach.
First, according to our experiments, our approach tailors the noise more specifically
to the privacy risks of the model being trained, resulting in a more accurate model
at a given accuracy level (see Section 5.5).
Second, our approach does not require gradient clipping, which can improve training time significantly. While significant progress has been made on per-example gradient calculation in the past few years [100], this approach still incurs a performance
penalty during training. Our approach does require per-example second-order gradients, but these are efficiently computed in both PyTorch and TensorFlow because
these gradients are computed with respect to the examples in the batch (not the
model weights).
Comparison with gradient-clipping. The structure of Algorithm 4 is nearly
identical to that of gradient-clipping differentially private training algorithms. In
particular, we can recover the gradient-clipping algorithm by replacing lines 5 and 6
with the “Compute gradient” and “Clip gradient” steps from Abadi et al. [7],
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Algorithm 4: Gradient-perturbation SGD using Immediate Sensitivity.
Input : Training data D, privacy parameters α̂, ˆ, batch size b, learning
rate η, epochs E.
Output: Noisy model θ.
ˆ
1 ˆi ←
E
2 θ ← random initialization
3 for E epochs do
4
for each batch (xb , yb ) ∈ D of size b do
5
G ← ∇L(θ(xb ), yb )
compute batch gradient
6
s ← ImmediateSensitivity(G, xb ) compute immediate sensitivity of
the gradient
2
add noise
Ĝ ← G + N (0, s2ˆα̂ I)
7
8
θ := θ − η Ĝ
update model
9 return θ
Algorithm 1, and modifying line 7 to average the clipped-per example and add noise
based on the clipping parameter C. With these changes, Algorithm 4 satisfies (α, )RDP; the only remaining difference is the use of parallel composition of batches rather
than privacy amplification by subsampling.
Meaning of the privacy parameters. Two parameters to Algorithm 4, α̂ and ˆ,
control the scale of the noise added to each gradient (together with the immediate
sensitivity of the gradient). These parameters serve the same function as the privacy
parameters in Rényi differential privacy, and are used the same way in gradientclipping approaches that use RDP for privacy analysis. However, we cannot prove
that Algorithm 4 satisfies (α, )-RDP for any values of α and , because immediate
sensitivity is only an approximation of the gradient’s sensitivity (not an upper bound).
If the constant-β hypothesis is true, then Algorithm 4 would satisfy (α, c)-RDP for
some constant c, by the standard privacy analysis [7].
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5.5

Evaluation

We aim to answer the following question empirically: “does gradient perturbation
with immediate sensitivity provide better accuracy than the gradient-clipping approach, for a similar level of defense against privacy attacks?” Our empirical evaluation answers this question in the affirmative, in two separate experiments:
1. Membership Inference: using the membership inference attack of Yeom et
al. [4], we show that our approach achieves better accuracy for a similar level of
membership inference advantage compared to gradient clipping.
2. Data Poisoning: using the data poisoning attack of Jagielski et al. [3], we
show that our approach achieves better accuracy for a similar estimated value
of  compared to gradient clipping.

5.5.1

Datasets, Models, and Hyperparameters

Table 5.1 summarizes the datasets, model architectures, and hyperparameters used in
our evaluation. We selected these datasets to enable a direct comparison to existing
work in membership inference [4, 5]. Like previous work, we train models using a
subset of each training dataset (usually, 10, 000 samples). A smaller training set
makes privacy attacks more effective, and allows for a better comparison between
defenses. Where possible, we used similar model architectures to previous work (the
exception is CIFAR-10, which requires a more complicated model for good accuracy).
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Texas-100: The Texas hospital dataset associates 6,000 binary features, representing a patient’s medical history, with one of 100 procedures performed on that patient.
From the 67,000 examples in this dataset, we extract a 10,000 sample training dataset
and a 5,000 sample test dataset [103].
Purchase-100X: The Purchase-100X dataset includes 600 binary features each
representing an item a customer might have purchased. Samples are clustered into 100
classes representing specific purchasing styles. Purchase-100X is a descendant of the
original Purchase-100 dataset. Features in Purchase-100X are the 600 most frequently
purchased items rather than the 600 randomly selected items used in Purchase-100 [5,
44]. Both data sets were extracted from Kaggle’s acquire valued customers challenge
[104].
Purchase-100X has about 300,000 samples. For our experiments, we randomly
select a subset of about 10,000 samples for our training dataset and 5,000 for the test
dataset. The model architecture we trained on Texas-100 and Purchase-100X is the
same that Jayaraman et. al [5] used to to evaluate their membership inference attack.
CIFAR-10: The Canadian Instititue For Advanced Research 10 dataset consists of
60,000 colored images equally partitioned into 10 classes. Each image is 32 x 32 with
3 channel RGB colored pixels. We use a subset of 10,000 samples for our training
dataset, and the standard 10,000 sample test dataset.
The CIFAR-10 model is a simple convolutional network of our own design that
achieves modest accuracy, while training well using privacy preserving approaches.
For example, we exclude batch normalization from our model to maintain compatability with existing privacy frameworks [13].
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Hyperparameter
Train-set # samples
Test-set # samples
Dense layers
Conv Layers
Pooling Layers
Widths
Batch Size
Learning Rate
ˆ

α
C
# trials

Texas-100
10,000
5,000
3
0
0
128, 256
64
10−3
1-100,000
1-1,000,000
2
.2
20

Purchase-100X
10,000
5,000
3
0
0
256
64
10−3
1-100,000
1-1,000,000
2
.1, .2, .5
20

CIFAR-10
10,000
10,000
1
6
2
N/A
64, 128
10−3
1-100,000
1-1,000,000
2
.1, .5, 1, 5, 10
5

FMNIST
6,000
N/A
3
0
0
256
64
10−3
0.1-100,000
1-1,000,000
25
1, 2, 5
20

Table 5.1: Dataset & model parameters for experiments.

FMNIST: Our second experiment uses the Fashion MNIST (FMNIST) dataset,
which includes 80,000 grayscale images of fashion items separated into 10 classes. We
use the same subset of 6,000 images from the FMNIST dataset as Jagielski et al. [3].
Our model architecture for FMNIST is the same as the one we use for the Texas-100
and Purchase-100X datasets.

5.5.2

Experiment 1: Membership Inference

Our first experiment measures the effectiveness of our approach in defending against
membership inference attacks, by comparing against differentially private gradient
descent with gradient clipping.
Experiment Setup. Our goal is to compare our approach to the gradient-clipping
approach on both accuracy and defense against the privacy attack. In this experiment, we measure defense effectiveness using membership inference advantage. With
higher advantage, the attacks are more successful, implying a less private model. We
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train models using both our immediate sensitivity approach and the gradient-clipping
approach [7] for various values of the privacy parameter, and plot accuracy against
membership inference advantage to make the comparison. For Purchase-100X and
Texas-100 models, we use the autograd-hacks library to implement gradient clipping [105]. With CIFAR-10 models, we use the Opacus differential privacy framework [13].
For each experiment configuration listed in Table 5.1, we train a series of models
on Amazon EC2 g4dn.xlarge instances. For Texas-100 and Purchase-100X datasets,
we train 20 models for each configuration. With CIFAR-10, we train 5.
Generating Pareto Fronts. By varying , ˆ, and C, we have a variety of models
showing the trade off between accuracy, and membership inference attack advantage. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 shows Pareto fronts that optimize accuracy and advantage
of models trained on our selected datasets using gradient clipping and immediate
sensitivity. To calculate the fronts, we start with a scatter plot of accuracy and
membership inference advantage results for models trained on a given dataset. Each
scatter point represents the average performance of a given model configuration at a
given epoch of training. For example, one immediate sensitivity point for Texas-100,
might be the average performance of 20 trained models at epoch 5 where  = 1000,
and width = 128. We take these averages to demonstrate that our results are robust
against various model initialization. Once this scatter of average model performances
has been developed, we calculate the Pareto front of min advantage and max accuracy
points through a standard strict dominance algorithm.
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Figure 5.2: Pareto optimized front of all model epochs based on accuracy and advantage.
Each model has been trained on a 10,000 example sub-sampled training set. Throughout the
front, immediate sensitivity models are always strictly dominant over their gradient clipping
counterparts.

Results. Throughout the fronts in Figure 5.2, immediate sensitivity are strictly
optimal compared to their gradient clipping counterparts. Table 5.2 demonstrates
immediate sensitivity trains a more accurate model underneath a certain threshold
of membership inference advantage in all tested circumstances. Figure 5.3 shows
the variance in membership inference advantage for each optimal model on the front.
There is an evident lack of overlap between the front of either technique, and the
variance of the other, implying that the superior performance of immediate sensitivity
is not a statistical anomaly.

5.5.3

Experiment 2: Data Poisoning

Our second experiment uses the data poisoning attack of Jagielski et al. [3] to evaluate
the effectiveness of our defense.
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Figure 5.3: Pareto fronts with Membership Inference Advantage variance for each optimal
model. This variance is calculated from the set of trained models for each model configuration. Points in the front are the average performance of the best performing model
configurations over 5-20 trials.

Dataset

Texas-100

Purchase-100X

CIFAR-10

Membership
Inference Adv.

Gradient
Clipping

Immediate
Sensitivity

Improvement

< 0.20
< 0.15
< 0.10
< 0.20
< 0.15
< 0.10
< 0.20
< 0.15
< 0.10

53%
52%
48%
64%
62%
54%
57%
55%
53%

54%
53%
51%
68%
67%
60%
60%
59%
58%

1%
1%
3%
4%
5%
6%
3%
4%
5%

Table 5.2: Selected validation accuracy results for a given "budget" of Yeom membership
inference Advantage. Each accuracy percentage in the rightmost two columns is the average
of 5 (for CIFAR-10) or 20 (for Purchase-100X and Texas-100) runs with a given model
configuration.
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Data poisoning attacks. Data poisoning or backdoor attacks [3,106–108] attempt
to modify the training data in a minimal way to produce a measurable change in the
predictions made by the trained model (e.g. to force the model to mis-label some
specific example in a class). Jagielski et al. [3] recently developed a data poisoning
attack specifically designed for auditing differentially private SGD procedures. The
approach involves training differentially private models many times on both the poisoned and un-poisoned data, and then measuring the attack’s success probability in
the two cases. Jagielski et al. show how to transform these probabilities into a lower
bound on the privacy parameter , providing an empirical method for measuring
differential privacy (see Jagielski et al. [3], Algorithms 2 and 4).
Experiment Setup. As in the first experiment, our goal is to compare our approach to the gradient-clipping approach on both accuracy and privacy. The primary
difference is the use of a data poisoning attack instead of a membership inference
attack. We use the implementation and poisoned FMNIST data released by Jagielski
et al. [109] to produce lower bounds on  for both our immediate sensitivity approach
and the gradient-clipping approach [7]. We used 1000 trials for each approach and for
each value of the privacy parameter. We also train 20 models in each configuration to
measure accuracy. We ran the experiments on Amazon EC2 g4dn.xlarge instances.
Results. Figure 5.4 and Table 5.3 present the results of our second experiment. As
shown in Figure 5.4, our immediate sensitivity approach produces higher accuracy
for a given measured lower bound on  than the gradient-clipping approach, and the
difference is significant for smaller measured values of . Table 5.3 provides concrete
accuracy numbers for selected measured values of . For small measured values of
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Dataset

Measured
 Value

Gradient
Clipping

Immediate
Sensitivity

Improvement

< 0.20
< 0.15
< 0.10
< 0.05

98.3%
98.3%
92.0%
76.3%

99.1%
98.1%
97.2%
97.2%

0.8%
−0.2%
5.2%
20.9%

FMNIST

Table 5.3: Selected validation accuracy results for measured lower bounds on  using the
approach of Jagielski et al. [3] on the FMNIST dataset. Each accuracy percentage is the
mean of 20 trials.

1.00

FMNIST

Accuracy

0.98
0.96
0.94
0.92

Gradient Clipping
Immediate Sensitivity

0.90
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30

Measured Epsilon

Figure 5.4: Accuracy vs. measured lower bounds on , using the approach of Jagielski et
al. [3] on the FMNIST dataset. Each data point is the mean accuracy of 20 trials; error
bars indicate standard deviation.
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, our approach provides a significant improvement in accuracy over the gradientclipping approach (e.g. 5.2% improvement for  ≤ 0.10 and 20.9% improvement for
 ≤ 0.05).

5.6

Conclusion

Limitations & future work. Our approach is inspired by differential privacy and
should share many of its properties. However, because immediate sensitivity is not an
upper bound on local sensitivity, our approach does not produce a provable guarantee
of privacy. In this regard, differential privacy still provides a stronger privacy guarantee. Extending our approach to achieve a provable privacy guarantee represents a
key opportunity for future work.
Our work is intended to improve privacy in machine learning, so we hope it will
have a positive impact on society. The primary risk to society in our work is the
potential for a misleading promise about privacy—if our empirical analysis of the
privacy benefits of our approach is too optimistic, then practitioners may not achieve
the privacy protection they expect. We believe the benefits to society of our approach
significantly outweigh this risk.
Conclusions. This paper proposes immediate sensitivity and shows how to use it
for privacy preserving deep learning. By taking advantage of automatic differentiation techniques, we are able to approximate the local sensitivity of each gradient
update, and precisely scale privacy preserving noise to train highly accurate, yet privacy preserving models. We validate the effectiveness of our approach empirically by
testing membership inference advantage and data poisoning attacks. Our results sug118

gest that immediate sensitivity provides better accuracy for the same level of privacy
compared to existing differential privacy-based approaches.

5.7

Appendix

The following figures display results for specific refinements of our experiments. Figure 5.5 displays pareto fronts for differing model widths. Each model has three fully
connected hidden layers with width measured in number of nodes. The nearly identical fronts implies that both approaches are stable with respect to our perturbations
in model architecture.
Figure 5.6 displays pareto fronts for CIFAR-10 models broken down by immediate
sensitivity batch size. We include gradient clipping batch size of 128 experiments
in both fronts because the batch size 64 experiments never obtained accuracy or
membership inference advantage high enough to be plotted regardless of the tested
epsilon. That said, we see very similar fronts for immediate sensitivity experiments
using both batch sizes.
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Figure 5.5: Pareto fronts for the different model widths of Texas-100. The nearly identical
results between these two fronts implies that our results are stable with respect to model
architecture changes.
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Figure 5.6: Pareto fronts for different CIFAR-10 batch sizes for immediate sensitivity. The
gradient clipping data in each plot is the same (batch size of 128) because our batch size of
64 results never obtained accuracy > 40% or advantage > .01
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Secure and private federated learning promises to protect data owners, while providing aggregators with useful models. Such solutions must balance privacy, model
utility, and training tractability: three appealing characteristics which often stand in
opposition to each other. The works presented in this dissertation strive to reduce
these tradeoffs in the following ways.
• The FLDP protocol provides an efficient mechanism for securely aggregating
long vectors of many parties, improving the accuracy and training cost tradeoff.
• The SHARD protocol scales secure aggregation among vectors to larger federations, futher improving the accuracy and training cost tradeoff.
• immediate sensitivty allows privacy preserving noise to scale with the sensitivity
of specific data samples. The more precise noise scale improves the accuracy
and privacy tradeoff.
Using these works, aggregators can efficiently obtain a useable model from private
data. By reducing the costs associated with private models, we hope more data can
122

remain in the hands of data owners, and that novel insights are achieved in privacysensitive domains.
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